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GENDER POLITICS AND
CHILD CUSTODY:
THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF
THE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARD
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT*
ROBERT E. EMERY**
I
INTRODUCTION
The best-interests-of-the-child standard has been the prevailing legal rule
for resolving child-custody disputes between parents for nearly forty years.
1
Almost from the beginning, it has been the target of academic criticism. As
Robert Mnookin famously argued in a 1976 article, “best interests” are vastly
2
indeterminate — more a statement of an aspiration than a legal rule to guide
3
custody decisionmaking. The vagueness and indeterminacy of the standard
make outcomes uncertain and gives judges broad discretion to consider almost
any factor thought to be relevant to the custody decision. This encourages
litigation in which parents are motivated to produce hurtful evidence of each
other’s deficiencies that might have a lasting, deleterious impact on their ability
to act cooperatively in the actual best interests of their children.
Despite these deficiencies, the best-interests standard has proved to be
remarkably durable. Although scholars as well as the American Law Institute
4
(ALI) have proposed reforms, legislative efforts to narrow the best-interests
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1. See, e.g., David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce,
83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1984); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the
Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions
in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975); Rena Uviller, Fathers’
Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 107 (1978).
2. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 229.
3. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 255 (quoting Lon Fuller, Sociology of Law Class Materials:
Interaction Between Law and Its Social Context 11 (Summer 1971), in which the author had observed
that a judge deciding custody under the best-interests standard is “not applying law or legal rules at all,
but is exercising administrative discretion . . . .”).
4. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
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standard have been largely unsuccessful. A few states have adopted a rule that
bases custody on parents’ caretaking, but at least one legislature has responded
to a courts’ imposition of a primary-caretaking rule by rejecting that rule and
5
reviving the best-interests standard. Repeated efforts by fathers’ groups to
6
enact laws favoring joint custody have usually failed as well. The persistence of
the best-interests standard presents a puzzle: Are the academic critics wrong or
does something other than the utility of the rule explain the reluctance of
policymakers to change the status quo?
In this article, we confirm the deficiencies of the best-interests standard and
seek to explain its persistence despite its obvious limitations. First we argue that
the standard’s entrenchment is the product of a gender war that has played out
in legislatures and courts across the country for decades. Most substantive
reforms have been perceived (usually accurately) as favoring either fathers or
mothers, and thus have generated political battles between their respective
advocates. The primary front in this war has been a protracted battle over joint
custody. Fathers’ groups have lobbied hard for statutes favoring joint physical
7
custody, but they have been opposed vigorously by women’s advocates. As a
result of the standoff, little progress has been made (in any direction) toward
replacing the best-interests standard with a custody decision rule that would
narrow and guide the judicial inquiry.
Mothers’ and fathers’ supporters have also battled over the formulation of
the best-interests standard itself, with each group arguing for presumptions that
can trump other factors when the standard is applied. Mothers’ advocates, allied
with law-enforcement groups, have lobbied effectively for a statutory
presumption disfavoring the parent who has engaged in acts of domestic
8
violence. Fathers’ groups have responded by seeking to persuade courts and
legislatures to assign substantial negative weight to one parent’s concerted
9
efforts to alienate the child from the other parent. Each of these factors
implicates a key policy concern and, in theory, might bring greater determinacy
to custody doctrine in important categories of cases. But domestic-violence and
alienation claims are difficult to verify, and courts are often ill equipped to
10
separate valid claims from those that are weak or false. This uncertainty
encourages contesting parents to raise marginal claims, which, if successful, can
11
trump other factors relevant to the best-interests determination. In turn,
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (2002). The ALI custody standard is based on the approximation standard
proposed by one of the authors. See Elizabeth Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody,
80 CALIF. L. REV. 615 (1992) [hereinafter Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody].
5. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009). The primary-caretaker preference had been adopted by the
state supreme court. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710–11 (Minn. 1985).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 41–62.
7. Id.
8. Many custody statutes include a rebuttable presumption disfavoring the parent who has
engaged in domestic violence. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 105–114.
10. See infra text accompany notes 87–88, 112–115.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 89–111 (discussing defensive and offensive use of these
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excessive use of domestic-violence and parental-alienation claims threatens to
12
diminish the credibility of genuine claimants.
The gender-based motivations of advocates battling over doctrinal reform
are understandable, but the apparent satisfaction of legal actors with the bestinterests standard is more puzzling. Judges and legislators are familiar with the
application of the standard in practice and might be expected to be concerned
13
about its indeterminacy. We argue that the legal system’s confidence in the
best-interests standard rests on a misplaced faith in the ability of psychologists
and other mental-health professionals (MHPs) to evaluate families and advise
14
courts about custodial arrangements that will promote children’s interests.
This confidence in MHPs is not justified. Clinical testimony in custody
proceedings often fails to meet even minimal standards of scientific validity and
MHPs have no special expertise in obtaining reliable family information in the
15
context of divorce. Moreover, psychology training and knowledge currently
does not provide the expertise to perform the complex function of evaluating
16
and comparing noncommensurable factors. Mental-health experts are no
better than judges at these tasks; their participation simply masks the failure of
the best-interests standard to provide legal guidance.
Although this account is rather pessimistic, there is reason to believe that
the deadlock can be broken if lawmakers understand that MHPs cannot cure
the deficiencies of the best-interests standard. We argue for the adoption of the
ALI’s approximation standard, under which custody is allocated between
parents on the basis of past caretaking. This rule offers a relatively verifiable
proxy for best interests that narrows judicial discretion and obviates the need
for psychological evidence; it might also be increasingly attractive as fathers’
17
parenting role expands. Moreover, even under existing law, evidentiary and
procedural reforms can mitigate the problems of the best-interests standard.
Psychological testimony can be subject to the screening that applies to scientific
18
evidence in other legal proceedings. Also, mediation and other reforms can
facilitate custody planning by parents themselves. Parents have better
information about family functioning than third-party decisionmakers and, in

claims).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 102–104.
13. See infra text accompanying note 116.
14. See infra Part IV. Mental-health experts in custody disputes include psychologists,
psychiatrists, clinical social workers and other clinicians.
15. See id.
16. See id. See generally Robert E. Emery, Randy K. Otto & William T. O’Donohue, A Critical
Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations: Limited Science and a Flawed System, 6 PSYCH. SCI. PUB.
INT. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations] (arguing,
on scientific grounds, that tests developed to assess questions related to custody are deficient); Timothy
Tippins & Jeffrey Wittman, Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody Recommendations, 43 FAM.
CT. REV. 193 (2005) (finding that the empirical foundation for conclusions based on psychological
evaluations in custody cases is tenuous or nonexistent).
17. See Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, supra note 4; infra Part VI.
18. See infra Part VI.B.
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most cases, are more likely than judges to make workable plans for their post19
divorce families.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the deficiencies of the
best-interests standard, focusing on the daunting verifiability challenges judges
face in applying the standard. Part III explores the political-economy
explanation for the persistence of the best-inerests standard. It examines the
gender war in legislatures, focusing particularly on the repeated battles over
joint custody in recent decades. Part IV explores the struggles to elevate the
importance of domestic violence and parental alienation respectively as key
factors in applying the standard, efforts that create a veneer of determinacy
important categories of cases. Part V focuses on the illusion of mental-health
expertise as the second key to the entrenchment of the best-interests standard.
We challenge the assumption that MHPs enable courts to escape the
indeterminacy of best interests and can guide them toward good custody
decisions. Part VI proposes substantive and procedural reforms that can
improve custody decisionmaking, potentially resulting in arrangements that
conform more closely to the law’s policy goal.
II
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARD?
A. Critiquing and Justifying the Standard
Much of the academic critique of the best-interests standard is familiar and
20
need not be rehearsed in detail. Like indeterminate standards generally, the
best-interests test generates high enforcement costs, inviting litigation and
21
imposing substantial burdens on courts and parties. In addition, custody
adjudication imposes onerous psychological costs that are exacerbated under
the best-interests standard. Because of its indeterminacy and the salience of
22
qualitative considerations, the standard encourages parents to produce
evidence of each other’s failings, intensifying hostility between them and
undermining their inclination to cooperate in the future in matters concerning
23
their child.
19. But see Jana Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family: Implications of a
Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 363 (2009) (describing trend toward private ordering, including
mediation, and expressing concern).
20. See Mnookin, supra note 1.
21. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560–62
(1992); see also Robert Scott & George Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE
L.J. 814, 818–19 (2006) (noting that indeterminate standards encourage parties to produce a broad
range of evidence in an effort to generate proxies that courts will favor).
22. Under the best-interests standard the quality of parenting and of each parent’s relationship
with the child are key factors. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009).
23. See Elster, supra note 1, at 24 (emphasizing the high costs to the child of custody litigation);
Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, supra note 4, at 622; Elizabeth Scott & Robert
Emery, Custody Dispute Resolution: The Adversarial System and Divorce Mediation, in PSYCHOLOGY
AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 23, 25 (Lois A.
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The substantial costs of applying an indeterminate standard are sometimes
justified when the circumstances relevant to decisions are so complex and
varied across cases that courts, with the advantage of hindsight, are in a better
position to determine the relevant criteria to be applied in individual cases than
24
are legislatures acting ex ante. The typical custody statute embodies this
rationale, directing courts to consider a wide range of proxies for best interests,
and thereby implicitly assuming that the mix of relevant factors and the weight
25
accorded to each will vary across families. Certainly, supporters articulate this
defense of the best-interests standard, arguing that, because of the complexity
of family circumstances, courts must have broad discretion to consider any
26
factor that might be relevant to a particular child’s best interests. On this view,
a more determinate rule that would restrict parties’ freedom to introduce wideranging evidence for judicial consideration is likely to result in bad decisions.
The case for the standard thus necessarily assumes that courts are competent to
select and weigh the relevant criteria for best interests in individual cases and to
evaluate the evidence offered by each party in support of his or her claim.
B. The Problem of Verifiability
This assumption is false: Courts are not well positioned to select and weigh
proxies for best interests or to evaluate the wide-ranging evidence offered by
parties. Often the evidence deemed relevant to the judicial inquiry—and,
relatedly, the criteria considered to be legitimate proxies for best interests—
cannot be verified; that is, contesting parents cannot prove such evidence to a
27
third-party decisionmaker. To be sure, family circumstances are varied and
Weithorn ed., 1987) (describing costs).
24. Under these conditions, the costs of defining the precise content of regulation through rules
that anticipate the many contingencies that might arise might be higher than the (high) enforcement
costs of applying a vague standard. See Kaplow, supra note 21, at 560–62 (discussing the relative
desirability of ex ante versus ex post lawmaking in terms of both legal costs and impact on behavior);
Scott & Triantis, supra note 21, at 842–43 (2006) (emphasizing the benefit of hindsight enjoyed by
courts).
25. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009) (prohibiting courts from focusing exclusively on one factor as
abuse of discretion). Other courts have found trial courts’ overemphasis on any single factor to be an
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Bartosz v. Jones, 197 P.3d 310 (Idaho 2008).
26. Opponents of a joint-custody presumption or of the approximation standard argue that courts
cannot be restricted from considering factors that might be important in individual cases. See ASSEMB.
COMM.
ON
JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307
(Cal.
2005),
available
at
ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_13011350/ab_1307_cfa_20050502_142229_asm_comm.html (describing this argument against joint custody).
One court cited approximation approvingly, but criticized it for restricting courts from considering
factors other than past caretaking. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa 2006).
27. Contracts scholars have probed the problem of verifiability, which arises when courts seek to
interpret and evaluate compliance with vague contract terms. The challenge is particularly difficult in
settings where the quality of performance is hard to evaluate, and information available to the parties is
not readily accessible to third-party decisionmakers. See Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1988) (noting that contingencies often cannot be described
in enough detail in contracts for courts to later verify what has occurred); Alan Schwartz, Relational
Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 271 (1992) (discussing that courts often engage in “gap filling” when contracts are incomplete);
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complex, and an omniscient judge might be capable of accurately assessing
evidence and selecting appropriate criteria in each case for weighing the
competing claims. But real-world judges frequently face insurmountable
obstacles as they seek to perform their role faithfully.
Three impediments severely handicap the ability of courts to evaluate the
evidence offered by disputing parents. First, the privacy of family life makes
assessing the accuracy of information in a custody proceeding extraordinarily
difficult. Second, the best-interests standard exacerbates this problem by
encouraging parties to introduce evidence of the quality of their parenting and
relationships with the children. These qualitative proxies are particularly
difficult for courts to evaluate accurately. And third, the factors considered to
be good legal proxies for best interests are intrinsically incommensurable and
judges simply are not capable of reliably calculating the weight of such factors
28
relative to one another.
1. Family Privacy and Verifiability
The ability of a third party to verify information about behavior and
relationships within a family is limited under the best of circumstances, because
much of family life is private and many interactions are not verifiable to
outsiders even when they are observable to family members. For example, one
parent might know from direct observation that the other has paid little
attention to the child, but, unless the disinterest is extreme, it is difficult to
convey this information persuasively to a judge. Beyond this, the parents’
29
perceptions about interactions and relationships might differ radically.
Distortions are likely to be particularly acute in the context of a contested
divorce proceeding, when each parent is highly motivated to describe family
30
relationships and behavior in a way that favors his or her claims.
2. The Challenge of Qualitative Proxies
These challenges might undermine courts’ ability to acquire accurate
information about family functioning under any rule or standard, but the
verifiability problem is exacerbated under the best-interests standard. Because
the standard implicitly focuses the inquiry on which party will be a better
Scott & Triantis, supra note 21 (noting that vague contracts, which result in investment in the back end
of the contracting process, might be more efficient in some circumstances).
28. The incommensurability problem inheres in Mnookin’s observation that courts applying the
best-interests standard ultimately must choose a set of values to guide decisions. See Mnookin, supra
note 1, at 260–61.
29. See ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD
CUSTODY, AND MEDIATIONS 3–14 (2nd ed. 2011) [hereinafter EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS] (discussing husbands’ and wives’ conflicting perspectives on factual matters regarding
their behavior and relationships with the child).
30. Sometimes children can provide information, but younger children might not be reliable
reporters. Giving minor children of any age a central role in providing evidence risks placing them in
the middle of the dispute between their parents. See Robert E. Emery, Children’s Voices: Listening–and
Deciding–is an Adult Responsibility, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 622 (2003) (arguing against involving
children in custody disputes).
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parent, it invites parties to introduce evidence of qualitative proxies for best
interests that are difficult to assess accurately. Custody statutes emphasize, for
example, the closeness of the relationship between parent and child, the
parents’ stability and competence to care for the child, and the openness of each
31
parent to the other’s relationship with the child. These factors might well be
relevant to the child’s welfare, but they rest on complex emotional and
32
psychological considerations that are often impervious to proof. Also,
information obtained in the midst of a bitter divorce provides a poor basis for
assessing family behavior and relationships before the crisis or for predicting
the future, because both parents and children often experience high levels of
33
stress. Thus a third party (a judge or MHP) might draw erroneous inferences
about the parent–child relationship, or about a parent’s character, mental
health, and childrearing competency on the basis of behavior that is context
34
specific.
3. The Incommensurability Problem
Finally, courts deciding custody face an often insurmountable challenge
because key best-interests factors are inherently incommensurable and
legislatures typically provide little guidance for resolving this problem. The
general assumption (consistent with the choice of a standard rather than a rule)
is that different proxies for best interests will vary in importance depending on
35
the circumstances of the case, and as a consequence statutes do not guide
courts by rank ordering factors. Thus, the court must assign weight to the
various factors the parties’ evidence is intended to establish. But what is the
right scale to use in balancing one parent’s claim that she has a closer bond with
the child against the other’s insistence that he is more stable emotionally? To
decide this question, the court must evaluate each factor on the basis of (1) its
relative importance to the child’s best interests, in general and in the case, and
(2) a judgment about the credibility and sufficiency of each party’s evidence
supporting a finding that the factor has been established. Courts will often be
unable to perform these tasks satisfactorily. Not only is this calculus prone to
error because each of these factors is difficult to verify, but the weight assigned
to competing factors will often ultimately rest on a subjective value judgment.
It is clear that courts often face insurmountable challenges in applying the
best-interests standard. To be sure, family circumstances are complex and
varied, but, in this context, there is little reason to believe that the broad
discretion the standard gives to judges results in better custody decisions. If
courts lack the ability to perform the tasks required to determine the best
interests of individual children, why has the best-interests standard endured for
31. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009).
32. Thus the parties might know that one parent is inattentive or that one has the closer bond with
the child, but proving that fact to a court in a bitterly contested custody case is often impossible.
33. See EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 29.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 21, at 838–39.
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forty years? Although scholars have been virtually unanimous in criticizing the
current legal regime, courts and legislators appear unmoved.
III
LEGISLATIVE BATTLES OVER CUSTODY
36

Two alternative custody rules have been advanced that would substantially
reduce the verifiability challenges facing courts in deciding custody cases, but
neither has been embraced by legislatures or courts. The first, a presumption
favoring shared physical parenting has been vigorously promoted by fathers’
37
groups for more than a generation, with limited success. Mothers’ advocates
have favored a rule that narrows the best-interests inquiry by focusing on past
parental caregiving, but they have not actively promoted it in the political arena
38
and it has gained little traction among lawmakers.
The durability of the best-interests standard (and the failure of lawmakers
to adopt either of the alternative rules described above) is in part the result of a
political-economy deadlock that has persisted for decades. The intense battles
between interest groups supporting mothers and fathers have focused on many
39
issues, but the ongoing struggle over joint custody has been the most sustained
and pervasive campaign in this gender war. Well-organized men’s groups lobby
for favorable joint-custody legislation, pitted against women’s groups who have
opposed these efforts with considerable success. Women’s advocates have
supported a primary-caretaker preference, but they have not promoted this rule
actively in the political arena, directing their efforts instead at defeating joint40
custody initiatives and lobbying for domestic-violence presumptions. The
political standoff over joint custody and the absence of the primary-caretaker
preference from legislative agendas have left the best-interests standard

36. The alternative rules, a presumption favoring joint custody and a rule focusing on past parental
caretaking, feature prominently in family-law casebooks. See, e.g., IRA MARK ELLMAN, PAUL M.
KURTZ, LOIS A. WEITHORN, BRIAN H. BIX, KAREN CZAPANSKIY & MAXINE EICHNER, FAMILY
LAW: CASES, TEXTS, PROBLEMS 560 (5th ed. 2010). They have also been debated at length by scholars.
See Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, supra note 4.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 48, 56, 62.
38. Instead, mothers’ groups favor the primary-caretaker preference. See infra text accompanying
notes 64–65. West Virginia adopted this rule in 1981. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va.
1981) (establishing primary-caretaker preference and listing relevant factors). More recently, scholars
and law reform groups have proposed an approximation rule that allocates future custodial time
between the parents on the basis of past caregiving roles. See Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and
Child Custody, supra note 4; infra Part VI; see also W. VA. CODE § 48-9-206 (2009 & Supp. 2013)
(adopting approximation standard).
39. Fathers’ organizations have lobbied for parental-alienation provisions, restrictions on
relocation by custodial parents, and reductions in child support, while mother advocates have opposed
these efforts and promoted domestic-violence laws and restrictions on admissibility of parentalalienation evidence. See AM. COAL. FOR FATHERS & CHILDREN, LOBBYING TO INFLUENCE
LEGISLATION IN YOUR STATE (2013), available at http://www.acfc.org/acfc/assets/documents/
Articles/acfcmanual_lobbying.pdf (describing lobbying activities of American Coalition of Fathers and
Children, a large fathers’ rights organization).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 64–73.
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entrenched as the custody decision rule.
A. The Fathers’ Movement and the Battle over Joint Custody
Fathers’ advocates have actively sought to reform child-custody law since
41
the 1970s. The political movement, which today includes a network of national
42
and local organizations, arose out of dissatisfaction with the legal treatment of
divorced fathers who, supporters believed, seldom won custody under the
ostensibly gender-neutral best-interests standard. Advocates protested that
restrictions on noncustodial fathers’ access to their children following divorce
diminished the parent–child relationship. At the same time, fathers were
required to assume a substantial burden of child support, which is a source of
43
resentment for many fathers.
The sustained effort to enact state laws favoring joint legal and physical
44
custody has been at the heart of fathers’ legislative agenda from the beginning.
In part, the goal was pragmatic: Fathers were unlikely to succeed in lobbying for
a custody rule that favored fathers over mothers. But shared custody promised
fathers equality with mothers in the allocation of custodial time and parental
authority. It also could reduce the burden of child support as fathers assumed a
45
larger share of child-care responsibility.
In legislatures across the country, men’s groups have promoted jointcustody legislation, returning year after year in some states to lobby for
favorable laws. The efforts have been intensive—including testimony, letterwriting and email campaigns, media-advertising campaigns, blogging, and the
46
placement of news stories, editorials, and op-eds. Many men’s organizations
47
have active web sites that cover political activities relating to joint custody.
41. James Cook, an early fathers’ rights advocate, led a successful 1980 campaign to enact
legislation favorable to joint custody in California. See James Cook, Activist, was the Father of Joint
Custody, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at A28.
42. Many men’s groups actively promote joint-custody reform. See AM. COAL. FOR FATHERS &
CHILDREN, http://www.acfc.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); EQUAL RTS. FOR DIVORCED FATHERS,
http://www.equalrightsfordivorcedfathers.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); FATHERS & FAMILIES,
http://www.fathersandfamilies.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); NAT’L COAL. FOR MEN,
http://www.ncfm.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
43. See MEL ROMAN & WILLIAM HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 1–21 (1978) (describing
fathers’ disgruntlement over traditional custody arrangements and advocating for joint custody);
Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 459 (1984)
(describing fathers’ anger at diminished role).
44. The American Coalition for Fathers and Children states first among its goals “equal, shared
parenting time or joint custody.” ACFC Mission Statement, AM. COAL. FOR FATHERS & CHILDREN,
http://www.acfc.org/mission/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
45. Many states have a different payment schedule for families in which the child resides for
substantial periods with both parents. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (2009) (lower rates for obligor
spending 110 days per year with child).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 50, 62 (discussing 2005 California initiative); see also sources
cited supra notes 40–43.
47. See supra sources cited notes 39, 42 (seeking to mobilize support for joint-custody laws). The
American Coalition for Fathers and Children keeps an active web site, blogging, issuing press releases,
and archiving an online newsletter and articles about divorce and custody, See AM. COAL. FOR
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The typical bill promoted by these organizations includes a presumption
favoring equally shared physical custody, rebuttable only by clear and
convincing evidence that this arrangement is not in the best interests of the
48
child.
Joint-custody campaigns have encountered stiff opposition in most states
from coalitions of opponents including, most prominently, advocates for
mothers. Two types of women’s organizations have been particularly active:
groups that advocate generally for women’s rights, particularly the National
Organization for Women (NOW), and groups that focus on domestic violence
and child abuse. NOW has taken a strong stand against a statutory presumption
favoring joint custody and has lobbied hard (and successfully) in a number of
49
states including California, Michigan, and New York. Domestic-violence
organizations have rallied to persuade legislators that shared custody represents
50
a serious threat to victims. These advocates often have been joined by
organizations of judges and attorneys, who urge the need to retain judicial
51
discretion under the best-interests standard.
In California, the battle over joint custody has played out over three
52
decades. Responding to early lobbying efforts by fathers’ groups, California
enacted a statute in 1980 that some read to create a preference for joint
FATHERS & CHILDREN, http://www.acfc.org (last visited May 21, 2014). Glenn Sacks, director of
Fathers and Families and a high-profile advocate for joint custody, writes a blog and appears on cable
TV frequently. See GLENN SACKS, http://glennsacks.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
48. Such bills have been introduced in many states including West Virginia, Iowa, New York,
California, Massachusetts, and Michigan. See, e.g., ASSEMB. A03181, 2009–10 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2009) (requiring court to order joint custody unless contrary to child’s interest); S.B. 438, 2009
Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009). Michigan fathers’ groups have repeatedly lobbied for a shared–physical
custody bill. See, e.g., H.B. 4564, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2007). After the court in In re Hansen, 733
N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 2007), held that the Iowa custody statute did not create a presumption favoring joint
physical custody, a group called Iowa Fathers lobbied for a bill clarifying that the statute does in fact
create such a presumption. See Senate File 507, IOWAFATHERS, http://iowafather.websitetoolbox.com/
post/Senate-File-507-1764757?trail=50 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (forum urging men to vote for such a
bill).
49. NOW actively lobbied against a proposed bill creating a joint-custody presumption in New
York in 2009. See Marcia Pappas, NOW - New York State Oppose Memo, Mandatory Joint Custody,
NOW - N.Y. ST., http://www.nownys.org/leg_memos_2009/oppose_a3181.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2013). Earlier Mike McCormick and Glenn Sacks credited NOW with blocking shared-parenting
legislation in New York and Michigan. See Glenn Sacks & Mike McCormick, NOW at 40: Group’s
Opposition to Shared Parenting Contradicts Its Goal of Gender Equality, GLENN SACKS (July 27, 2006),
http://glennsacks.com/blog/?page_id=2400. Business and Professional Women/USA also lobbied
actively against the 2005 California bill. See ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307
(Cal. 2005), available at ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1301-1350/ab_1307_cfa_
20050502_142229_asm_comm.html.
50. A coalition of domestic-violence groups, the California Alliance against Domestic Violence,
played a key role in the 2005 California battle over joint-custody legislation. See BILL ANALYSIS, AB
1307; Irene Weiser & Marcia Pappas, Fathers’ Responsibilities Before Fathers’ Rights, NOW - N.Y. ST.
(July 29, 2006), http://www.nownys.org/fathers_resp.html (arguing that mandatory joint custody
threatens domestic-violence victims).
51. In California, the family-law section of the state bar and the judicial council opposed the 2005
joint-custody bill. See BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307.
52. See supra text accompanying note 41.

3_SCOTT & EMERY_EIC (RECOVERED) (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2014]

GENDER POLITICS AND CHILD CUSTODY

7/18/2014 9:39 AM

79

53

custody. Women’s groups, described as “strangely silent” during the debate
54
over this law, began to mobilize in the mid-1980s and lobbied successfully for
the 1988 statutory revisions that clarified that California law included no
55
presumption for joint custody. Since that time, the best-interests standard has
remained the custody decision rule in California, despite major campaigns by
fathers’ rights groups promoting shared parenting. In 2005, for example, a bill
creating a presumption favoring equally shared physical custody was sponsored
56
by a broad coalition of fathers’ rights organizations. The bill was opposed by
57
women’s organizations, domestic-violence groups, the family-law section of the
58
state bar, and organizations of judges, and it ultimately failed.
In general, the effort to promote joint-custody legislation has fallen far short
of the goals of the fathers’ rights movement. To be sure, there have been some
successes. Statutes in California and a few other states create a presumption
favoring joint custody if parents agree to the arrangement, while other states
direct courts to explain the decision not to order joint custody when proposed
59
by a parent. And legislatures in many states have enacted policy statements
endorsing substantial contact with both parents, often at the urging of fathers’

53. The statute lists joint custody first in the order of preferences that guides judges among
available custody options. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a) (West 2004) (rank ordering custody preference
“to both parents jointly or to either parent”). It also includes a presumption favoring joint custody
when the parties agree. Id.
54. Hugh McIsaac, Who Get’s the Children? Clarifying Joint Custody, L.A. TIMES, Dec 18, 1988, at
3 (describing history of joint custody in California and 1988 statute). NOW took an active role in
lobbying against joint-custody laws by the mid-1980s. Id.
55. Id.; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(b) (West 2004). The 1988 (and current) statute expressly
provides, “This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal
custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, but allows the court and the family the widest discretion
to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(c) (West
2004). One legislator expressed regret that fathers groups were disappointed, but said, “We want what
is best for kids, not the daddies.” See BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307.
56. Testifying in favor of the bill at the hearings were representatives of the Children’s Rights
Council (active in the 1988 legislative battle), the Family Rights Network, Men Enabling New
Solutions, Live Beat Dads, and the Coalition of Family Support. Testimony on AB 1307 Before Assemb.
Comm. on Judiciary, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); see also BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307.
57. See BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307. Women’s groups included California NOW, the California
Alliance Against Domestic Violence, the Feminist Majority, California Women’s Law Center, the
national and state Business and Professional Women’s Organizations, and the Commission on the
Status of Women. Id.
58. Id. The judiciary committee ultimately declined to vote out the bill for full assembly
consideration. Id.
59. IOWA CODE § 598.41(1)(A) (2001) (requiring writing to explain why joint physical custody was
not ordered when requested by a party). But see In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 696 (Iowa
2007) (holding this provision does not create a presumption favoring joint custody). A few statutes
appear to favor joint legal custody. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009) (creating a rebuttable
presumption favoring joint legal custody when a parent requests); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1) (2012)
(directing that joint custody be encouraged “when appropriate”). Margaret Brinig finds this change to
have a modest impact on custody orders. She concludes that the statute functions as a penalty default
that parties bargain around. Margaret Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child
Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 811–12 (2006).
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groups. These reforms, no doubt, have influenced courts in some states to be
61
more receptive to joint custody and perhaps to fathers’ claims generally. But
the most important goal of fathers’ advocates is a statutory presumption
directing that fathers and mothers have equal time with their children, and this
62
prize has eluded them in most states. In response to the intense political battle
between mothers’ and fathers’ advocates, legislatures have declined to enact a
custody rule favoring joint physical custody and have retained the best-interests
standard instead.
B. The Politics of Motherhood
This account of the political battles over joint custody sheds some light on
the durability of the best-interests standard, but it also raises further questions.
Women’s advocates have played a key role in resisting joint-custody reforms,
but why have they done so little to promote the legislative enactment of a rule
more favorable to mothers? Feminist scholars have emphasized the deficiencies
of the best-interests standard and argued that mothers are disadvantaged in
63
custody adjudications under contemporary law. Many feminists strongly favor
a preference for the primary caretaker, which is also endorsed by women’s
64
organizations. But promoting this reform has not been a priority for mothers’
65
advocates. Instead, their efforts to influence custody law have been directed
toward resisting joint-custody initiatives, promoting strong domestic-violence

60. See infra text accompanying notes 106–107 (discussing these policies and friendly-parent
provisions). A substantial majority of state statutes include these provisions favoring contact with both
parents. See ABA COMM. DOM. VIOLENCE, CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY STATE
(2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/Custody.
authcheckdam.pdf.
61. But see Brinig, supra note 59 (finding many couples opt out of joint custody; also finding
increase in domestic-violence claims when laws endorse substantial contact with both parents).
62. A few states have statutory presumptions favoring shared physical parenting. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 61.13 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (2006) (not
requiring equal time). But fathers’ advocates claim many more. See Testimony on AB 1307 Before
Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (statement of Rep. Mervyn
Dymally) (rejecting the assertion that the bill was a radical reform, suggesting that eleven states had
similar laws). This exaggeration might represent an effort to persuade legislatures that joint custody
represents an emerging trend. Some ambiguity is created by statutes that do not distinguish clearly
between legal and physical custody. Idaho, Iowa, and Texas, often described as states with joint-custody
presumptions, favor joint legal custody but not equal residential time. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32717B (2009); IOWA CODE § 598.41(1)(A) (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131 (West 2008).
63. See generally Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality,
38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991); Martha Fineman, Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1031 (2001); Nancy Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing? 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
235 (1982).
64. See Domestic Relations, NOW-N.Y. ST., http://www.nownys.org/domesticrel.html (last visited
on Nov. 5, 2012). This web page includes a mission statement that it supports legislation requiring that
custody be awarded to the primary caregiver. This statement is not presented on the main NOW web
page and is not elaborated.
65. Id. NOW has devoted far more energy to fighting joint-custody initiatives and promoting
domestic-violence presumptions. Women’s groups undertook a modest unsuccessful effort to enact the
preference in California in 1988 as part of battle over joint custody. See McIsaac, supra note 54.
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presumptions and permissive relocation rules, and seeking to discredit and
66
exclude parental alienation as a relevant factor.
The reasons for this seeming disinterest in reforming the best-interests
standard are likely complex. Women’s organizations such as NOW might view
the primary-caretaker preference as a “hard sell” politically because, given
contemporary family roles, it clearly favors mothers, despite its formal gender
67
neutrality. In contrast, fathers’ interest groups can promote a joint–physical
custody presumption as grounded in gender equality. But it is also likely that
advocates for mothers are simply not as dissatisfied with the best-interests
standard as are fathers and their supporters. To be clear, mothers groups
protest the failure of courts deciding custody disputes to recognize domesticviolence claims and judges’ willingness to consider (what they view as bogus)
68
alienation evidence. But, mothers’ supporters simply do not express the kind
of pervasive bitterness about custody outcomes under the best-interests
standard that has energized fathers and fueled the joint-custody movement.
Indeed, in the political battle over joint custody, mothers’ advocates have
aligned with judges and attorney groups in defending the discretionary best69
interests standard. For example, mothers’ groups in Minnesota did not oppose
the 1989 legislation abolishing a judicially created primary-caretaker standard
70
and reinstating the best-interests standard. Further, a statewide survey of
family-law attorneys found strong support for the view that judges tend to favor
mothers in custody proceedings (and little support for the view that they favor
71
fathers). This evidence is far from conclusive, but it does suggest that mothers
66. NOW, along with regional groups such as the California Alliance Against Domestic Violence,
have actively lobbied against joint-custody bills. See supra note 50 and sources cited therein. Domesticviolence groups have also challenged the judicial emphasis on parental alienation as harmful to victims.
See Irene Weiser, The Truth about Parental Alienation, PLEASE JUDGE, NO, http://pleasejudgeno.com/
PAS__The_Truth.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). California women’s groups supported bills aimed at
limiting the admissibility of evidence of parental-alienation syndrome (PAS). See Child Custody
Evaluation Changes, CAL. ALLIANCE FOR FAMILIES & CHILDREN, http://www.cafcusa.org/
child_custody_evaluations.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) (fathers’ group describing and criticizing the
campaign to limit admissibility of PAS evidence).
67. In Minnesota, a key argument in favor of legislative abolition of primary-caretaker preference
was that the preference was unfair to fathers. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 494 n.227 (1990).
68. See Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding
Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 657 (2003)
(analyzing why domestic violence is discounted by courts deciding custody); supra note 66 (describing
opposition to PAS evidence).
69. In opposing joint-custody legislation, mothers’ organizations have advocated for retaining the
discretionary standard. See Testimony on AB 1307 Before Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2005–2006
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307 (Cal. 2005),
available
at
ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_13011350/ab_1307_cfa_20050502_142229_asm_comm.html.
70. See Crippen, supra note 67.
71. OREGON SUPREME COURT/OREGON STATE BAR TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS,
GENDER EQUITY SURVEY OF LAWYERS: SURVEY RESULTS 7 (1997) [hereinafter GENDER EQUITY
SURVEY OF LAWYERS], available at https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/
1026/GENDER%20Lawyer%20Full%20Report.pdf?sequence=5 (more domestic-relations lawyers
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in general fare relatively well in custody proceedings and their advocates in the
political arena do not see the need for dramatic reform of the best-interests
standard.
The intense focus on domestic violence might also have diverted attention
from other concerns that are perceived to be less urgent than the need to
protect women and their children in custody disputes. Mothers’ groups link
virtually all custody initiatives to domestic violence, including the opposition to
72
joint custody and to friendly-parent provisions. Indeed, many active opponents
of joint custody are groups primarily concerned with domestic violence, rather
73
than with broader women’s issues. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the
gender war over custody law is sometimes characterized by politicians as a
74
battle between men’s groups and anti–domsetic violence advocates.
C. Legislative Response to Gender Politics
The thirty-year gender war over custody has resulted in a political-economy
deadlock that has likely contributed to the entrenchment of the best-interests
standard. Legislatures have declined to act, in part, because each of the two
more precise rules that have substantial political support is perceived as
favoring either fathers or mothers and is therefore unacceptable to a powerful
interest group that is ready to battle against enactment. This is the lesson of the
struggle by fathers’ groups to enact joint-custody legislation, and no one doubts
that efforts by mothers’ advocates to enact a primary-caretaker preference
would face similarly fierce resistance. Under these conditions, legislatures
considering the enactment of either custody rule can anticipate high political
costs. Thus, interest-group competition has likely led to legislative inaction, an
outcome reinforced by continuing support for the best-interests standard by
judges and attorneys—respected nonpartisans in the gender war.
The absence of significant legislative movement to replace the best-interests
standard is compatible with observations of political scientists and legal scholars
who study the political economy of lawmaking. Public-choice theory suggests
that when the political costs of enacting a rule are high, legislatures will
sometimes opt for a vague standard, delegating to courts the task of providing
surveyed find judicial bias against fathers (70% agree) than mothers (5% agree) in custody
proceedings); see also WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS TASK FORCE ON GENDER
FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE
COURTS 50–57 (1996) (finding that mothers are awarded custody under primary-caretaker statute when
care is evenly divided).
72. See Amy Levin & Linda Mills, Fighting for Child Custody When Domestic Violence is an Issue,
48 SOC. WORK 463 (2003) (arguing that abusers seek joint custody to gain access to victims and that
women must be free to oppose this arrangement); see also Weiser, supra note 66 (linking of PAS and
domestic violence authored by NOW leader).
73. See Weiser, supra note 66.
74. See Hearing on SB 243 and SB 244 Before Sen. Comm. on Bus., L. & Gov’t, 1997 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 1997) (statement of Bill Howe, Chair, Oregon Task Force on Family Law) [hereinafter
Hearing on SB 243 and SB 244] (emphasizing that the legislature must not adopt the views of interest
groups).
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75

legal content in individual cases. Advocacy groups are more likely to mobilize
when legislation clearly impacts their interests than when outcomes are
uncertain. In the realm of custody legislation, the contrast between the smooth
enactment of statutes embodying the best-interests standard in the 1970s and
1980s and the more recent battles over joint custody is instructive. The former
76
appear to have generated little political controversy. Who could be offended
by the innocuous expression of a benign policy goal accompanied by a list of
factors for judicial consideration? In contrast, the struggles over joint custody
suggest the difficulties in accomplishing collective legislative action on
contested issues. In the face of organized opposition, lawmakers might be
inclined to punt, enacting or retaining a vague standard and delegating hard
decisions to courts.
IV
DEFINING BEST INTERESTS: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND PARENTAL
ALIENATION
The gender war over custody has also played out in battles between
mothers’ and fathers’ advocates over the content of the best-interests standard
itself—with greater success on both sides. Mothers’ advocates have effectively
promoted statutory provisions categorically disfavoring the parent who has
77
78
violently threatened either his child or the other parent. In response, fathers’
groups have sought to weaken these laws while urging lawmakers (also
successfully) to emphasize parental alienation as a key factor in the custody
79
decision. Both domestic violence and alienation implicate core policies of
modern custody law. The importance of prohibiting an abusive or violent
parent from obtaining custody is self-evident, but parental alienation is also
linked to a key policy goal—the promotion of both parents’ continued
80
involvement with the child after divorce. In recent years, domestic-violence
claims by mothers and alienation claims by fathers have assumed prominence in

75. Public-choice theory predicts that where competing interest groups advocate for and against
legislation, legislatures will either favor no bill or delegate regulation to agencies or courts, rather than
incurring the wrath of one of the opposing groups. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, PHILLIP FRICKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY, 58–60 (4th ed. 2007).
76. The 1989 adoption of the Minnesota best-interests standard, promoted by fathers groups, was
uniformly supported by the Minnesota Bar Association and faced little opposition by women’s groups.
See Crippen, supra note 67, at 227.
77. The male pronoun is used to describe perpetrators of domestic violence not because only
males engage in this behavior, but because mothers’ groups have advocated for strong domestic
violence laws and fathers’ groups have opposed them.
78. More than half of the states have rebuttable presumptions explicitly disfavoring granting
custody to an abuser (passed in response to lobbying by mothers’ groups); other states include domestic
violence as a factor to be taken into account in granting custody. See ABA COMM. DOM. VIOLENCE,
supra note 60.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 105, 156.
80. See infra text accompanying note 109.
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custody adjudications, often trumping other evidence offered by the parties.
On first inspection, these reforms seem like positive developments that
could mitigate the deficiencies of the best-interests standard by bringing
determinacy to important categories of cases in which particular bad behavior
82
should presumptively disqualify a parent from custody. But as we show in the
discussion that follows, domestic-violence and (particularly) parental-alienation
claims themselves are very difficult for courts to evaluate. Because of this
uncertainty, and because these factors are weighed so heavily in custody
decisions, parents may be motivated to bring marginal claims and courts may be
unable to distinguish these claims from legitimate allegations.
A. The Domestic-Violence Presumption
Over the past generation, legislatures in most states have enacted laws
emphasizing that acts of domestic violence warrant special attention in custody
decisions. Physical abuse of a child has long been a key consideration in
deciding custody, but until recently, violence toward a spouse or partner was
83
not presumed to be of particular importance to the child’s welfare. This
changed as advocates argued persuasively that exposure to violence in the home
84
harms children, whether they are targeted or not. Today most custody statutes
direct that a parent who has engaged in acts or threats of violence against either
85
a child or the other parent is presumed to be unsuitable for custody. These

81. See James Bow, Jonathon Gould & James Flens, Examining Parental Alienation in Child
Custody Cases: A Survey of Mental Health and Legal Professionals, 37 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY (2009)
(estimating that thirty percent of cases involve parental-alienation claims); Peter Jaffe, Claire Crooks &
Samantha Poisson, Common Misconceptions in Addressing Domestic Violence in Custody Disputes, 54
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 57, 58–59 (2003) (citing studies showing seventy-five percent of cases involve
domestic-violence claims).
82. In other legal settings governed by vague standards, doctrine often evolves over time in ways
that increase determinacy in case outcomes. Louis Jaffe described the how courts narrow broad
principles through precedent. Louis Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate
Premises, 80 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1967). Custody law has also incorporated several rules that
presumptively outweigh other factors in the application of the best-interests standard. For example, in
some jurisdictions, the custodial preference of an older child is presumed to be dispositive. Elizabeth
Scott, N. Dickon Reppucci & Mark Aber, Children’s Preferences in Adjudicated Custody Decisions, 22
GA. L. REV. 1035, 1039 (1988) (describing a legal trend toward recognizing older child’s preference).
83. A judge in the custody dispute between O.J. Simpson and his deceased wife’s parents excluded
evidence that he killed his wife. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 560.
84. Domestic violence became an important political issue in the 1980s and 1990s, and advocates
have been the driving force in lobbying for domestic-violence presumptions, with important support of
law-enforcement interests. See generally JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009) (describing growing importance of
domestic violence). Support was generated by studies indicating that perpetrators of spousal or partner
abuse are at risk for committing child abuse as well. Robert Strauss, Supervised Visitation and Family
Violence, 29 FAM. L.Q. 229, 237–38 (1995). Studies also showed psychological harm to children from
exposure to violence between parents. See generally CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE 55
(George W. Holden, Robert Geffner & Ernest N. Jouriles eds., 1998).
85. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2 (West 2013) (presumption triggered by “history of, or
potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse or kidnapping”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(9) (2012)
(presumption triggered by “family abuse”).
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laws create a rule within the broader best-interests standard aimed at a
86
presumably small subset of cases involving violent parents.
A domestic-violence presumption would seem to represent a sound and
uncontroversial proxy for best interests. Few would object to the idea that a
parent who acts violently toward his child or partner is unsuitable to be his
child’s custodian, or that evidence of serious domestic violence should trump
other considerations in the custody decision. Moreover, a domestic-violence
presumption avoids the evidentiary problems created by incommensurable and
complex emotional and psychological factors when it can be established
through concrete factual evidence of the alleged behavior.
But often this is not possible, and evidence of domestic violence might be
even less accessible to outsiders than evidence of other private family behavior.
Perpetrators of child sexual abuse invariably act secretly, and children might be
unable to provide credible accounts of the behavior. Adult victims also might be
reluctant to disclose acts of violence even to relatives and friends when the
family is intact. Thus, unless the perpetrator has inflicted severe injury requiring
medical attention, or the victim, other family members, or neighbors have
reported incidents to law-enforcement authorities, the behavior might be
known only within the family. In many cases, the parent’s report will be the
primary source of evidence supporting a domestic-violence claim in a custody
dispute and the court’s decision about whether to apply the presumption will be
based on a judgment about the claimant’s credibility and that of the parent
87
denying the charge. Courts typically rely on psychological evaluations in
making this determination, but as we explain below, these evaluations are also
88
based largely on parents’ accounts and are of questionable reliability. As a
consequence, judicial determinations might result in a great deal of error—both
in failing to believe victims who in fact were battered or abused and in finding
abuse where claims are exaggerated.
The extent to which parents bring insubstantial domestic-violence claims is
unclear. Not surprisingly, fathers’ groups argue that a high percentage of
89
allegations are false, while mothers’ advocates insist that marginal claims are
86. See ABA COMM. DOM. VIOLENCE, supra note 60.
87. A few statutes require corroborated evidence or an elevated standard of proof. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.3 (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717 (2013) (“habitual perpetrator”); IOWA
CODE § 598.41(1) (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.24 (2011) (clear and convincing evidence); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 125.480(4)(k) (2012) (clear and convincing evidence). But most statutes have no such
restrictions. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2004) (preponderance of evidence); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-124 (2013) (“credible evidence”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 13.705A (2009) (no
standard); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (West 2008 & Supp.
2013) (credible evidence).
88. See James N. Bow & Paul Boxer, Assessing Allegations of Domestic Violence in Custody
Evaluations, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1394, 1394–96 (2003) (describing MHPs’ reliance on
victims’ reports); Jaffe et al., supra note 81; Janet Johnston, Soyoung Lee, Nancy Olesen & Marjorie
Walters, Allegations and Substantiations of Abuse in Custody-Disputing Families, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 283,
290 (2005); infra text accompanying notes 147–149.
89. See, e.g., STEPHEN BASKERVILLE, AM. COAL. FOR FATHERS & CHILDREN, FAMILY
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: THE TRUTH ABOUT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD ABUSE 36 (2006),
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rare. The truth probably lies somewhere between these poles. False claims
likely are rare, but more common might be allegations based on suspicions (in
the case of child abuse) or exaggeration of the seriousness of violent incidents
due to distorted recollections. Thus an angry mother might erroneously
interpret her child’s behavior and comments as providing evidence of abuse by
92
the father, or an atypical act of aggression might be remembered as part of a
93
pattern of intimidation. Researchers report that individuals with no history of
94
violence may strike out at their spouses in the midst of marital breakdown.
These isolated incidents are quite different from the violence perpetrated in
95
battering relationships, but perceptions and memories in the context of divorce
available at http://www.acfc.org/acfc/assets/documents/research_pdf's/FamilyViolenceEdit.pdf (arguing
that allegations of domestic violence in custody are either false or isolated incidents that are the
product of divorce conflict); RICHARD A. GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR
PARENTS AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1986) [hereinafter GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY
LITIGATION] (arguing that most sexual-abuse claims in custody proceedings are false); RADAR
SERVICES, INC., AN EPIDEMIC OF CIVIL RIGHTS ABUSES: RANKING OF STATES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
LAWS 4 (2008), available at http://ncfm.org/libraryfiles/Children/DV/Ranking-of-States-DV-Laws.pdf
(finding that most domestic-violence claims in divorce involve families with no history and that
allegations of abuse are “part of the gamesmanship of divorce”).
90. See Lisa Bolitan, When Parents Fight: Alaska’s Presumption Against Awarding Custody to
Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 263, 293 (2008) (reporting evidence indicating
that mothers seldom make false domestic-violence claims in custody disputes); Developments in the
Law — Battered Women and Child Custody Decisionmaking, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1619 (1993)
(arguing false allegations of domestic violence are unlikely because violent behavior produces evidence
and children are often witnesses). The real problem, according to mothers’ groups, is that judges do not
MOTHERS
CUSTODY
CONFERENCE,
believe
mothers’
allegations.
See
BATTERED
http://www.batteredmotherscustodyconference.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
91. The most careful study found that about fifty percent of abuse claims against fathers were
substantiated in some way (police records, witnesses, medical reports, or expert testimony). See Thea
Brown, Fathers and Child Abuse Allegations in the Context of Parental Separation and Divorce, 41 FAM.
CT. REV. 367 (2003); see also Johnston et al., supra note 88. But see infra text accompanying notes 145–
149 (describing problems with expert testimony).
92. Research evidence indicates that child–sexual abuse claims are substantiated less frequently
than partner-violence claims. See Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 506 (finding between twenty-three and
forty-two percent of child–sexual abuse claims are substantiated); Johnston et al., supra note 88, at 290.
93. For a description of how a spouse’s behavior and negative traits become exaggerated in the
midst of divorce, see Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Ungerwager, Sexual Abuse Allegations in Divorce and
Custody Disputes, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 451 (1991).
94. The category of separation-linked violence involves isolated uncharacteristic acts of violence
by either spouse “reacting to stress of separation or divorce in a relationship that has not otherwise
been characterized by violence or coercive control.” Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 501. All types of
domestic violence increase at the time of divorce. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, VIOLENCE AND THE
FAMILY: REPORT OF THE APA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY (1996).
95. Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 501. The goal of protecting victims in battering relationships
involving an ongoing pattern of intimidation and injury has driven the legislative adoption of domesticviolence presumptions. Researchers identify several distinct categories of domestic violence, one
involving violence in battering relationships, and two involving separation-linked violence. See Peter
Jaffe, Janet Johnston, Claire Crooks & Nicholas Bala, Custody Disputes Involving Allegations of
Domestic Violence: Toward a Differentiated Approach to Parenting Plans, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 500, 500–
01 (2008) (describing several categories and citing studies finding these categories); Michael P. Johnson,
Apples and Oranges in Child Custody Disputes: Intimate Terrorism vs. Situational Couple Violence, 2 J.
CHILD CUSTODY, no. 4, 2005, at 43; Nancy Ver Steegh, Differentiating Types of Domestic Violence:
Implications for Child Custody, 65 LA. L. REV. 1379 (2005).
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can be unreliable. Domestic-violence allegations are pervasive in this setting.
Some advocates argue almost all custody disputes involve a violent parent,
97
which seems unlikely. The evidence is scant but it suggests that parents
98
sometimes bring marginal claims.
It is easy to see how this might happen. Under the best-interests standard,
the outcome of custody adjudication is uncertain and a presumption that trumps
other factors provides a powerful advantage. An attorney representing a
mother appropriately will probe whether her client or the client’s child has been
a victim of family violence, and will present any credible evidence that might
99
persuade the court to apply the presumption to the case. Under these
100
conditions, it would be surprising if marginal claims were not advanced.
What harm is incurred if parents sometimes offer marginal domesticviolence claims? This practice might potentially create two kinds of harm
beyond mundane administrative costs. First, courts might wrongly apply the
presumption, to the detriment of good fathers and their children. A finding of
domestic violence can influence the outcome beyond the determination of
which parent is awarded custody; it also often results in restrictions on a
101
parent’s access to the child. This is appropriate when serious violence is
accurately verified, but not if the finding is erroneous.

96. See Bow & Boxer, supra note 88, at 1396 (reporting allegations in 72%–80% of cases); Jaffe et
al., supra note 81 (reporting allegations in 75% of cases); Garland Waller, Biased Family Court System
Hurts Mothers, WOMEN’S ENEWS, INC. (Sept. 5, 2001), http://womensenews.org/story/commentary/
010905/biased-family-court-system-hurts-mothers#.Ukoa2Rz8dv0 (reporting allegations in 70% of
contested cases); Weiser & Pappas, supra note 50 (reporting allegations in 80% of cases).
97. See Letter from the Family Violence Intervention Steering Committee for Multnomah County
to the Oregon Task Force on Family Law (1997) (arguing for presumption that all adjudicated custody
cases involve violence).
98. A survey of domestic-relations attorneys representing both men and women found that a
majority thought that marginal claims of domestic violence were sometimes raised in custody cases. See
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ALL COMM., OREGON JUDICIAL DEP’T, GENDER FAIRNESS 2002, at 53–55
(2002),
available
at
http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/docs/osca/cpsd/courtimprovement/access/gftf/
gf2002.pdf. The problem might be greater when the father seeks joint custody and is opposed by the
mother. Margaret Brinig found that domestic-violence claims by mothers increased significantly in
response to Oregon legislation favorable to joint custody. Brinig argues that mothers claimed domestic
violence to avoid application of a new law. See Brinig, supra note 59, at 804, 810. Even sympathetic
observers acknowledge that the salience of domestic violence to custody might encourage false or
marginal claims. See Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 508; see also William Austin, Assessing Credibility in
Allegations of Marital Violence in High-Conflict Child Custody Cases, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS.
REV. 462 (2000) (suggesting that claiming domestic violence creates a strategic advantage and
expressing concern over false claims).
99. If claims were readily verifiable, marginal claims would be deterred. For example, if a
presumption favored the taller or shorter parent, strategic use would be difficult (but the presumption
would be a bad best-interests proxy).
100. A 1990s study (conducted at a time when domestic-violence claims were likely less common
than they are today) indicated that judges tended to favor the parent alleging spousal abuse, even if the
claim was not substantiated. See Bow & Boxer, supra note 88, at 1397.
101. Under many statutes, parents found to have perpetrated domestic violence are restricted to
supervised visitation or excluded from contact with their children altogether. See GA. CODE ANN. § 199-3 (2011); IND. CODE § 1-17-2-8.3 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(2) (2011).
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A second cost is more speculative, but also potentially troubling: Courts
confronted with frequent claims of family violence in custody disputes
(including some that appear to be marginal or even spurious) might come to
adopt a skeptical stance, rejecting not only false allegations but legitimate
claims as well. If so, the insistence by mothers’ advocates that judges tend to be
102
unsympathetic to these claims might be accurate. Experience with claims of
child sexual abuse in the 1990s suggests that courts may become somewhat
103
skeptical in response to ubiquitous allegations supported by weak evidence.
A presumption that a violent parent should not be awarded custody is a rule
supported by important policy interests that potentially can resolve an
important category of disputes without requiring difficult comparisons with
other evidence. However, the ability of courts to verify domestic-violence
claims is uncertain because the information is often private; this informational
104
asymmetry encourages marginal claims that, under current legal formulations,
threaten to undermine the utility of the presumption.
B. Parental Alienation as a Response
As family violence emerged as a key factor in custody adjudication in the
1980s, advocates for fathers responded by promoting the importance of parental
alienation, often claiming that domestic-violence allegations were part of a
pattern of alienation. These efforts have been effective, partly due to
proponents’ success in linking parental alienation to custody law’s strongly
articulated policy of encouraging both parents’ continued involvement in their
105
children’s lives after family dissolution. This policy goal has been advanced
102. See Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family and the Lawyering Process: Lessons
from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1993) (describing bias against domesticviolence claimants in family-law cases); Mildred Daley Pagelow, Justice for Victims of Spouse Abuse in
Divorce and Child Custody Cases, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 69 (1993); Jay G. Silverman et al., Child
Custody Decisions in Cases Involving Intimate Partner Violence: A Human Rights Analysis, 94 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 951, 953 (2004).
103. The evidence is suggestive. In the 1980s and 1990s, many custody disputes involved sexualabuse allegations, often supported by MHP testimony. See Alan Klein, Forensic Issues in Sexual Abuse
Allegations in Custody/Visitation Litigation, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 247 (1994). This psychological
evidence was challenged not only by fathers’ advocates, see, e.g., GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY
LITIGATION, supra note 89 (noting most sexual abuse claims in custody disputes are false), but also by
neutral observers, see, e.g., Johnston et al., supra note 88 (describing low rate of substantiated child–
sexual abuse claims); Robert Levy, Using Scientific Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM.
L.Q. 383 (1989). Today these allegations are raised less frequently, while claims of partner violence
have increased dramatically. Elizabeth S. Scott, Survey of Child–Sexual Abuse and Domestic-Violence
Allegations in Custody Disputes (July 2011) (on file with authors). Fathers’ advocacy groups currently
also focus on false allegations of domestic violence. AM. COAL. FOR FATHERS & CHILDREN,
http://www.acfc.org (last visited May 21, 2014) (home page describing research compilation on false
claims of domestic violence).
104. In part V, we propose reforms that might improve judges’ ability to evaluate domestic-violence
claims.
105. Other reforms promoting this goal include the requirement of parenting plans and the
expanded parental authority of noncustodial parents. See Elizabeth Scott, Parental Autonomy and
Children’s Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1073 n.9, 1081 (2003) [hereinafter Scott, Parental
Autonomy].
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through statutory friendly-parent provisions directing courts to encourage
cooperation by considering the extent to which each parent supports the other’s
106
relationship with the child. Although lawmakers viewed these measures as
107
creating positive incentives for parents, their primary impact has been to
elevate the importance of parental alienation as an extreme form of
noncooperation.
In contrast to domestic violence, no formal legal presumption disfavors the
hostile parent, or provides a trump to the parent demonstrating alienation.
Nonetheless, over the past generation courts have assigned great importance to
108
this custody factor. This is due partly to the efforts of fathers’ advocates, but
also to MHPs urging the importance of alienation through expert testimony in
custody proceedings. Indeed, the prominence of alienation is due in part to the
relentless efforts of psychologist Richard Gardner, who in the 1980s identified
“parental alienation syndrome” (PAS) based on his observation of divorcing
fathers wrongly accused (in his view) by hostile mothers of abusing their
109
children. Many experts follow Gardner in framing the alienating parent’s
conduct as a mental disorder, but even those who do not endorse the
“syndrome” diagnosis view alienation as a critically important issue in
110
evaluating best interests. Thus, a parent whose child is withdrawn or hostile
toward him has reason to expect that expert testimony on alienation will count
heavily in his favor. As with domestic violence, the importance assigned to this
factor encourages marginal claims. Because only the most acrimonious parents
111
typically adjudicate custody, alienation claims are ubiquitous.
Like domestic-violence allegations, charges of alienation rest on private
family information that might be difficult for a court to verify; indeed, courts
might be unable to even assess the source of a child’s hostility toward a parent.
But parental-alienation claims are also problematic for another reason.
Currently, we simply lack the scientific knowledge to determine whether anger

106. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2004) (weighing “which parent is more likely to allow the child
. . . frequent and continuing contact with the non-custodial parent”). At least thirty-two states have a
friendly-parent provision of some kind. See ABA COMM. DOM. VIOLENCE, supra note 60.
107. Bill Howe, Chair of an Oregon family-law task force, argued that a friendly-parent provision
would create beneficial incentives for parents. “You score points by explaining how you will encourage
the relationship with the other parent.” Hearing on SB 243 and SB 244, supra note 74 (statement of Bill
Howe, Chair, Oregon Task Force on Family Law).
108. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 663–64; Scott, Parental Autonomy, supra note 105.
Alienation claims are also important in relocation cases. See In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81
(Cal. 2004).
109. See generally RICHARD GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: A GUIDE FOR
MENTAL HEALTH AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (2nd ed. 1998) [hereinafter GARDNER, THE
PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME]. Richard Gardner offers a comprehensive treatment of PAS and
an argument for its relevance to custody disputes. Id. But see infra text accompanying note 112
(discussing lack of scientific basis for PAS).
110. See Bow, Gould & Flens, supra note 81 (finding alienation to be among the two or three most
important custody factors).
111. Studies have found about thirty-five percent of adjudicated cases involve alienation claims. See
id.
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directed toward a parent in the context of divorce is entrenched or transitory, or
112
to evaluate the benefit (or cost) of awarding custody to the estranged parent.
Even though alienation is grounded in a legitimate objective of custody law—to
promote both parents’ future involvement in their child’s life—it has no
scientific basis as a factor for determining best interests.
An alienation claim may have particular salience when the other parent
alleges domestic violence. In fact, many custody disputes play out as gender
battles in which courts are presented with competing claims of domestic
violence and parental alienation. Often, one kind of evidence is introduced to
113
counter and nullify the other. Thus, a father might introduce evidence of
parental alienation to persuade the court that the mother’s allegation of
114
violence is not merely false, but pathological. In turn, a mother who is
targeted with alienation charges can explain her hostile attitude as grounded in
genuine fear of the father’s abusive conduct and her consequent need to protect
115
her child. Sometimes these claims are valid—and most likely are honest. But
the importance of these factors—already key under contemporary custody
law—has been amplified, and it is also at least plausible that their strategic use
has increased because the factors have been enlisted as competing weapons in
the ground war between mothers and fathers over custody.
In theory, the emergence of domestic violence and parental alienation as
key custody factors seems to represent progress toward a more satisfactory legal
framework for resolving custody disputes. The success of advocates for mothers
and fathers in establishing the importance of these issues may have allayed their
concerns about the vagueness and uncertainty of the best-interests standard.
Moreover, the factors themselves embody important policy objectives and
might guide courts in resolving two important categories of cases. In general,
112. See Carol Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome and Alienated Children — Getting it Wrong in
Child Custody Cases, 35 FAM. L.Q. 527 (2001) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the deficiencies
of PAS).
113. PAS was conceived in part to provide a defensive weapon for fathers in custody battles
involving domestic-violence claims. See supra text accompanying note 109 (discussing development of
PAS by Richard Gardner, who believed fathers in custody disputes were wrongly accused of domestic
violence). A survey of family lawyers and MHPs involved in custody assessments found reports of
thirty-five percent of cases involving both alienation and domestic-violence claims and of twenty-nine
percent involving both child abuse and alienation. Bow, Gould & Flens, supra note 81. Many judicial
opinions feature both claims. See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.H. & Y.A., No. A120227, 2009 WL 2106145,
at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 17, 2009) (father awarded custody because mother demonized father to the
children); Smith v. Smith, No. FA010341470S, 2003 WL 21774003, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 15,
2003) (father claimed that he should get sole custody because his wife had alienated his son from him,
claiming abuse); Schumaker v. Schumaker, 931 So. 2d 271, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (mother
claimed domestic violence; father in response claimed alienation); Renaud v. Renaud, 721 A.2d 463,
465 (Vt. 1998) (mother claimed abuse of child, which psychiatric experts challenged; father claimed
alienation); see also Janet Johnston, Children of Divorce Who Reject a Parent and Refuse Visitation:
Recent Research and Social Policy Implications, 38 FAM. L.Q. 757, 758 (2005) (showing that reasons why
some children do not want a relationship with one parent are complex).
114. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME, supra note 109.
115. Domestic-violence advocates argue that parental-alienation claims are used to discount
children’s legitimate fears in violent family situations. See Weiser, supra note 66.
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these benefits might have diminished frustration with the application of the
best-interests standard and contributed to its durability.
For the benefits of greater determinacy to be realized, however, judges must
be able to accurately adjudicate domestic-violence and alienation claims and, as
we have shown, this is often extremely difficult. Nonetheless, judges frequently
consider these claims, apparently without complaining that the assignment
exceeds their capacities. In the next part, we describe how judges turn to MHPs
to assist them in assessing domestic-violence and alienation allegations and,
more generally, in evaluating best interests and advising them on custody
decisions.
V
THE ILLUSION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERTISE IN RESOLVING CUSTODY
DISPUTES
The political-economy deadlock provides only a partial explanation for the
entrenchment of the best-interests standard. Also important is judges’ and
attorneys’ apparent satisfaction with the custody standard: Both groups have
opposed joint-custody laws, arguing that courts must be afforded broad
116
discretion to consider the circumstances of each custody dispute. To an extent,
judges may simply enjoy the broad discretionary authority afforded by a vague
standard (and it may create greater demand for attorneys’ services). But courts’
117
routine practice of consulting with psychologists and other MHPs to assist
118
has obscured the rule’s
them in applying the best-interests standard
deficiencies and likely dampened frustration with its application. Although
judges are unlikely to speak in these terms, they seem to believe that these
experts have the skill to obtain private family information and assess its
credibility, and the knowledge to evaluate and compare factors for determining
best interests. Thus, in most custody proceedings, MHPs play a critical role as
neutral experts whose opinions are sought by courts and whose
recommendations often determine custody arrangements, either as the basis of
119
the court order or as the impetus for parents’ agreement.

116. In the 2005 legislative battle over joint custody in California, a representative of the family-law
section of the state bar opposed the “cookie cutter” approach of a joint-custody presumption and
articulated the standard rationale for retaining a vague standard to resolve custody decisions. “Judicial
discretion is necessary in custody matters because . . . families are different. This difference requires
different custody orders tailored to fit the specific family and the needs of the children.” See Testimony
on AB 1307 Before Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005).
117. Our criticism applies with equal force to psychologists and other MHPs (mostly psychiatrists
and clinical social workers) who serve as experts in custody disputes. But only psychologists administer
and interpret (what we view as inappropriate) psychological tests. See infra text accompanying note
134.
118. See Daniel Shuman, The Role of Mental Health Experts in Custody Decisions: Science,
Psychological Tests and Clinical Judgment, 36 FAM. L.Q. 135, 157–58 (2002) (discussing the growing use
of court-appointed experts in custody cases).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 120–127.
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This delegation of judicial function to mental-health experts is deeply
problematic. These professionals might be better positioned than judges to
acquire private family information and they can sometimes assist courts by
offering observations about family functioning or parental pathology. But
MHPs are not experts in assessing credibility. Moreover, they lack the scientific
knowledge to guide them in linking clinical observations or test data to
qualitative proxies for best interests or in comparing incommensurable factors
to make custody recommendations to the court. A part of the problem is that
the rules that generally restrict the admissibility of scientific evidence in legal
proceedings are often not applied to custody proceedings, and judges tend to be
uncritical in assessing the quality of the opinions of court-appointed experts.
Were the standard evidentiary screen applied, most psychological evidence that
currently forms the basis of custody decisions (including expert testimony on
domestic violence and alienation) would be excluded and the deficiencies of the
best-interests standard would likely be clearer.
A. The Role of Mental-Health Experts in Resolving Custody Disputes
The influence of MHPs in shaping custody decisions is linked to two
dimensions of their role that distinguish them from experts in other legal
120
proceedings: Their input is solicited by the court and they are invited to offer
121
opinions on the ultimate legal issue. Of course, parents, like litigants in other
legal proceedings, can introduce psychological testimony in support of their
122
respective claims. But opinions of party experts may be seen as biased,
whereas MHPs who perform custody evaluations as neutral experts are
123
presumed credible and their opinions carry substantial weight.

120. Courts have the authority to appoint experts under the Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. R.
EVID. 706, and under some state statutes, but seldom exercise this authority. John Wiley, Taming
Patent, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413, 1429–31 (2002). One reason cited is relevant to custody proceedings:
concern about experts’ neutrality. See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651,
665 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he judge cannot be confident that the expert whom he has picked is a genuine
neutral.”).
121. In general, ultimate-issue testimony by experts is problematic because it usurps the fact
finder’s function. See Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1065 n.10 (9th Cir.
2002) (excluding ultimate-issue testimony on this basis); JOHN CONLEY & JANE MORIARTY,
SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 110 (2007). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not require
exclusion of ultimate-issue testimony if the evidence would otherwise be admissible. FED. R. EVID. 704.
We will argue that ultimate-issue testimony in custody proceedings should be disallowed under this
provision.
122. Commentators argue that evaluators working for one party are so handicapped by their
position that the party-expert practice should be avoided for both scientific and ethical reasons. See
Lois Weithorn & Thomas Grisso, Psychological Evaluations in Divorce Custody: Problems, Principles
and Procedures, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES
AND EXPERTISE 157, 162–65 (Lois A. Weithorn ed., 1987).
123. See Shuman, supra note 118, at 160 (arguing that the role of psychologists “is being
transformed from expert as expert to expert as judge”); see also James Bow & Francella Quinnell,
Critique of Child Custody Evaluations by the Legal Profession, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 115, 121 (2004)
(finding that eighty-four percent of judges and eighty-six percent of attorneys wanted evaluators to
make specific custody recommendations).
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MHPs’ recommendations influence custody outcomes in several ways. First
and most obviously, courts typically request that MHPs make specific
recommendations regarding the custody arrangement that will promote the
124
child’s best interests, and judges usually follow the advice offered by court125
appointed experts. But beyond their direct influence on courts, MHPs’
opinions also influence parents’ decisions to settle their disputes. Neutralevaluation reports are commonly shared with the parties prior to the custody
hearing, in part to encourage a settlement in accord with the expert’s
126
recommendation. The empirical evidence indicates that this strategy is
effective: Evaluations lead to the settlement of a substantial proportion of cases
127
that otherwise appear to be destined for litigation.
MHPs have assumed this expansive and unusual role as experts in custody
proceedings because courts have encouraged them to do so. In the face of
daunting challenges in applying the legal standard, judges enlist MHPs to guide
them in evaluating the parties’ claims and to offer an opinion on the ultimate
issue of what allocation of custody between the parents will promote the child’s
best interests. But in doing so, courts are asking more of mental-health experts
than they are capable of producing on the basis of their expertise.
B. Analyzing the Custody-Evaluation Process: The General Critique
A well-trained MHP might play a useful but limited role in providing the
128
court with information derived from a clinical family evaluation. Mentalhealth experts are trained to conduct interviews of individuals regarding
intimate matters and to observe behavior and interactions, some of which might
be relevant to custody. They also have the opportunity to interact with families
in a setting that is more conducive to acquiring information than is possible in a
courtroom. Moreover, MHPs can diagnose established mental illnesses on the
basis of observed behavior; thus, a psychologist can inform the court that a
parent suffers from depression, schizophrenia, or a serious substance-abuse
124. See Bow & Quinnell, supra note 123.
125. MHP recommendations are highly predictive of custody outcomes. See Emery et al., A Critical
Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations, supra note 16; Steven Erickson, Scott Lilienfeld & Michael
Vitacco, A Critical Examination of the Suitability and Limitations of Psychological Tests in Family
Court, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 157 (2007); Shuman, supra note 118.
126. See Shuman, supra note 118, at 159.
127. Id. at 158; see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 137–40 (1992) (describing settlement postevaluation). A
relatively new dispute resolution process, “early neutral evaluation,” has the explicit goal of promoting
settlement. Couples litigating custody are offered a brief, confidential, and relatively inexpensive MHP
evaluation, after which the evaluator discloses her tentative custody recommendation. See generally
Jordan Santeramo, Early Neutral Evaluation in Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 321 (2004) (reporting
a high settlement rate).
128. The typical custody evaluation includes clinical interviews of parents and children,
observations of parent–child interactions, psychological testing of both parents and children, and,
sometimes, a review of medical and psychological records and contact with teachers and other
professionals involved with the family. See generally JONATHAN GOULD & DAVID MARTINDALE, THE
ART AND SCIENCE OF CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS (2007).
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problem. But even in this limited role, clinicians’ performance might be
hampered in custody evaluations in ways that do not arise in other clinical
settings. Much of the information on which MHPs rely comes from contesting
parents who are motivated to create a positive impression and disclose only
information useful to their claims. Psychological training does not provide the
tools to obtain accurate and complete private information from parents or to
129
assess its credibility.
Moreover, many MHPs do not limit themselves to these contributions.
Instead, they draw inferences from their objective observations to reach
psychological conclusions about family members and their relationships with
one another. Based on those conclusions, they sometimes offer predictions and
assessments relevant to custody, and often an opinion about the custody
decision itself. This input routinely involves the evaluation of qualitative factors
such as the closeness of the parent–child relationship, parental competence, and
130
alienation. But social scientists have questioned whether the evaluators in
most custody cases have the expertise to contribute input beyond observations
131
and established diagnoses. These critics argue that psychologists violate both
scientific norms and professional ethical standards when they offer opinions
132
based on the typical evaluation process.
This questionable inferential process is deployed in several ways to support
opinions that rest on uncertain or illusory science. First, many MHPs use
clinical observations to make speculative predictions and substantiate favored
133
diagnoses or constructs that are without scientific foundation. MHPs bolster
their conclusions with findings from psychological tests that are a core element
of most custody evaluations. These tests carry an aura of scientific objectivity,
134
but, as critics have demonstrated, add little to the clinical evaluation. Further,
129. MHPs might have a slight advantage over judges in this regard, but extensive research reveals
only minor differences in the ability to detect lies based on professional training or other qualities. See
generally Charles Bond, Jr. & Bella DePaulo, Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy
and Bias, 132 PSYCHOL. BULL. 477 (2008).
130. Tippins and Whitman offer an example of this inferential process by describing how a
psychologist might form a psychological opinion on a parent–child relationship: The psychologist
observes the child clinging to his mother’s leg and concludes that he fears separation from her. Based
on this conclusion, the expert predicts that long separations from his mother will likely cause this child
to experience significant distress; therefore, the child should live with his mother and overnight visits
with the father should be avoided at this time. See Tippins & Whitman, supra note 16.
131. Id.; see also Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations, supra note 16;
Erickson et al., supra note 125, at 131; Shuman, supra note 118.
132. Tippins and Wittman note that a specific custody recommendation appears to violate AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC., ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT
standard 9.02(b) (2010), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/principles/pdf, which mandates that
“[p]sychologists use assessment instruments whose validity and reliability have been established for use
with members of the population tested. When such validity or reliability has not been established
psychologists [must] describe the strengths and limitations of the test results and interpretation.” See
Tippins & Wittman, supra note 16, at 205.
133. PAS is a good example of such an unsubstantiated diagnosis. See infra text accompanying
notes 152–161.
134. Psychological tests routinely employed in custody evaluations include those that are
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mental-health evaluators routinely offer opinions about issues that are
135
controversial without acknowledging the underlying scientific uncertainty. In
general, psychological opinions are shaped by professional and theoretical
136
perspectives and personal biases in ways that are seldom transparent. Finally,
in offering opinions on the ultimate issue of how custodial responsibility should
be divided, psychologists make a number of questionable inferential moves on
the basis of their observations, evaluating and comparing the relative
137
importance of particular factors to custody. Nothing in the relevant scientific
knowledge or in clinical training provides the expertise to perform these
functions. Not surprisingly, scientific critiques of custody evaluations uniformly
conclude that MHPs should play a very circumscribed role in adjudication and,
138
in particular, should not offer opinions on the ultimate issue of custody.
C. Assessing Family Violence and Parental Alienation
As explained in part IV, many adjudicated custody disputes involve claims
139
of parental alienation, domestic violence, or both, usually supported by the
testimony of mental-health experts. Although claims might often be legitimate,
the critique of psychological evaluations in custody disputes applies with as
much force to these issues as it does more generally. At least today,
psychological assessments of allegations of family violence and parental
alienation raise troubling issues of scientific validity and reliability, and,
140
standing alone, offer inadequate support for these claims. Mental-health
experts have no greater knowledge or expertise in evaluating the credibility of
these allegations than do judges, and in the case of parental alienation the
construct itself is grounded in deeply flawed “science.”

scientifically valid but of very limited utility in this setting (such as the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory) and those that have little or no demonstrated validity (such as the Rorschach
inkblot test). Several authors critique the use of psychological tests in custody evaluations. See Marc
Ackerman & Melissa Ackerman, Custody Evaluation Practice: A Survey of Experienced Professionals,
28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 137 (1997); Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody
Evaluations, supra note 16; Erickson et al., supra note 125, at 166.
135. For example, MHPs disagree about whether infants and toddlers should have overnight
visitation. See Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations, supra note 16, at 11.
136. Thus, the evaluator’s concern about separation anxiety in Tippins and Wittman’s example, see
supra note 130 and source cited therein, might derive from a Freudian view of mother–child
attachment.
137. See Tippins & Wittman, supra note 16, at 205 (describing an example in which the evaluator
might compare the importance of the child’s separation anxiety to factors that weigh in favor of the
father, for example, his greater emotional stability).
138. See Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations, supra note 16; Shuman,
supra note 118; Tippins & Wittman, supra note 16.
139. See supra text accompanying note 113.
140. Domestic-violence claims are often supported by police and court records, medical records,
accounts of witnesses, and physical evidence. What is problematic is expert testimony substantiating a
parent’s allegation on the basis of the evaluator’s conclusion that her account is credible, where other
evidence is absent.
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1. Family Violence
Many domestic-violence claims are decided by courts, in part because of an
understandable view that these allegations should be adjudicated rather than
resolved through mediation or other forms of dispute resolution that might not
141
protect victims. Not surprisingly, courts often turn to psychological experts for
assistance in evaluating these claims, and often the clinician’s role is to endorse
or challenge the alleged victim’s credibility, on which basis custody can be
142
decided.
The evaluation of family-violence allegations is a complex business.
Allegations of physical or sexual abuse of children are often based largely on
evidence provided by the accusing parent, who might already be distrusting and
suspicious of the alleged abuser. Among the frequent claims of partner violence
143
in custody cases, some allegations likely involve the pattern of violent acts
emblematic of a battering relationship, while others may be based on acts of
less serious situational violence—a product of heated conflict in the midst of
144
divorce. The latter might not be predictive of future behavior, despite victims’
145
beliefs and concerns about their severity. Ascertaining the nature and extent
of violence on the basis of the alleged victim’s claim may be difficult or
impossible absent corroborating evidence.
Psychological experts can contribute to custody cases involving domestic
violence by evaluating alleged victims for post-traumatic stress disorder in
146
appropriate cases.
Beyond this, MHPs have little to add to victims’
allegations. Although empirical efforts are underway to develop objective
147
measures for assessing domestic-violence claims, the research is at an early
stage. Currently, if objective external evidence is not available, custody
evaluators must rely on participants’ reports in attempting to determine
141. See generally Special Issue, Domestic Violence, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 431 (2008).
142. See Austin, supra note 98; Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 507–08 (discussing credibility
assessment). Some argue that custody arrangements should differ (ranging from no contact to
coparenting) based on the potency, pattern, and identity of the primary perpetrator of domestic
violence. See Jaffe et al., supra note 81.
143. See supra note 103 and sources cited therein (discussing incidence of claims over time).
144. See sources cited supra note 95 (discussing types of domestic violence).
145. A growing consensus indicates that conflict-instigated or situational violence and separation
violence are the most common categories of domestic violence, and are often reciprocal. Joan Kelly &
Michael Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and
Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476 (2008). But women are far more likely than men to
be victims of violent acts causing serious injury or death. See Lois Weithorn, Protecting Children from
Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1,
13–14 n.33 (2001).
146. Post-traumatic stress disorder is a recognized psychiatric diagnosis under the revised text of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-4-TR). AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 463–68 (4th
ed., text rev. 2000).
147. See Desmond Ellis & Noreen Stuckless, Domestic Violence, DOVE, and Divorce Mediation, 44
FAM. CT. REV. 658 (2006) (discussing evidence on a new instrument, the Domestic Violence Evaluation
(DOVE), an empirically based measure designed to assess levels of risk that grounds assessment in selfreporting, such that it does not avoid the problem of potential bias).
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whether a pattern of serious domestic violence exists. But MHPs have no
special skill in determining the truth in a controversy that often boils down to
149
“he said, she said.” No scientific research supports their ability to determine
the accuracy of allegations of violence or to distinguish among different types of
violence in an individual case on the basis of the alleged victims’ reports.
Further, critics assert that domestic-violence evaluators are biased toward
150
believing victims,
which, if true, makes their involvement even more
problematic. Incorrect “expert” opinions either supporting or discrediting
domestic-violence claims can have devastating consequences.
2. Parental-Alienation “Syndrome”
Expert opinion on parental alienation represents the most troubling misuse
of psychological evidence in child-custody proceedings. To be sure, the
important policy of promoting cooperation between parents is supported by
psychological knowledge: The research indicates that exposure to severe
151
conflict between parents is harmful to children’s adjustment after divorce. But
expert testimony on parental alienation typically is not based on this
knowledge. Instead, as discussed above, parental alienation emerged as a key
issue in custody proceedings in part through the efforts of psychologist Richard
152
Gardner, who “discovered” PAS and labeled it a psychiatric disorder. His
work and advocacy for PAS have been highly influential with custody
153
evaluators (even those who reject the syndrome diagnosis) and indirectly with
154
courts. According to one survey, experienced evaluators listed alienation as
the second most important factor in child-custody evaluations (following only a

148. See Austin, supra note 98.
149. Victims’ advocates recognize that there is often little extrinsic evidence to corroborate victims’
accounts of domestic violence, but still lament that courts frequently do not accept such victims’
accounts for adjudicative purposes. Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 507–08. William Austin points out that
no methodology currently exists to assess credibility in this context and emphasizes the need to look to
external corroborating or disconfirming evidence. See Austin, supra note 98.
150. See, e.g., GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION, supra note 89; GARDNER, THE
PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME, supra note 109. Domestic-violence advocates argue that
evaluators not trained in domestic-violence assessment tend to discount claims. See CLARE DALTON ET
AL., NAVIGATING CUSTODY & VISITATION EVALUATIONS IN CASES WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A
JUDGE’S GUIDE 1, 17, 19 n.35 (2006).
151. See generally E. MARK CUMMINGS & PATRICK DAVIES, MARITAL CONFLICT AND
CHILDREN: AN EMOTIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE (2010); Robert Emery, Interparental Conflict
and the Children of Discord and Divorce, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 310 (1982).
152. But the DSM-4-TR does not include PAS as a disorder or even as one of several “Criteria Sets
and Axes Provided for Further Study.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 146, at 759. Moreover, the
recently published fifth edition of the manual does not include any official mention of PAS. See AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed.,
2013).
153. Bow, Gould & Flens, supra note 81, at 134–35 (study of MHPs showing twenty-six percent of
custody evaluations involve alienation, but seventy-five percent of respondents did not view alienation
as a “syndrome.”).
154. This is probably because parental cooperation in general is an important consideration. See
supra text accompanying notes 144–146.
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parent’s active alcoholism). Although not all MHPs subscribe to Gardner’s
claim that granting custody to the alienated parent is the prescribed “cure” for
the disorder, an expert’s conclusion that a child’s hostility towards one parent is
based on the other parent’s alienating behavior can be dispositive in shaping
156
her recommendation.
Despite its influence on MHPs and courts, the “diagnosis” of PAS lacks any
157
credible scientific basis. Gardner’s studies fail to meet minimal requirements
158
universally recognized in the scientific community. The study on which
Gardner based his diagnosis used no statistical analysis and was not subject to
independent evaluation through publication in a peer-reviewed journal—a core
159
requirement for legitimate scientific research. Further, his research has never
160
been replicated, another key criterion of valid research.
Scientists have begun to study children who are aligned with one parent and
hostile to the other in the context of family breakdown, but this research, to
date, offers little guidance to courts. It suggests that the causes of children’s
alienation are complex: Either or neither parent can contribute to the
estrangement. Some children might simply align with a parent in response to
161
the family crisis. Scientists also cannot yet predict the impact of alienation on
the child’s future relationship with the targeted parent. And they do not know
whether separating the child from the aligned parent does more harm than
good.
Parental alienation might be a good theoretical proxy for best interests, but
in practice it depends on evidence that is not verifiable, because the construct is
155. Alienation was deemed more important than domestic violence, the child’s emotional
relationship with each parent, and each parent’s emotional well-being. Ackerman & Ackerman, supra
note 134, at 142.
156. Nicholas Bala, Suzanne Hunt & Carolyn McCarney, Parental Alienation: Canadian Court
Cases 1989–2008, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 164, 166 (2010) (in Canadian study, judges found alienation in 82 of
135 cases between 1999 and 2008).
157. See Robert Emery, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Proponents Bear the Burden of Proof, 43
FAM. CT. REV. 8 (2005) (challenging scientific merit of PAS); Joan Kelly & Janet Johnston, The
Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 249 (2001)
(criticizing PAS as lacking scientific basis and proposing sounder approach to identifying alienated
children); Janet Johnston & Joan Kelly, Rejoinder to Garner’s “Commentary on Kelly and Johnston’s
‘The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome,’ 42 FAM. CT. REV. 622 (2004)
(response to Gardner’s critique of authors’ earlier article).
158. For example, his diagnosis of PAS was based almost entirely on interviews with his clients,
parents who claimed to be the victim of alienation. See GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION
SYNDROME, supra note 109, at 41 (explaining that “the likelihood of my obtaining cooperation from
more than a small percentage of the alienators was extremely small”).
159. Gardner acknowledged the lack of statistical analysis in PAS studies. See Richard A. Gardner,
Commentary on Kelly and Johnston’s “The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of the Parental Alienation
Syndrome,” 42 FAM. CT. REV. 611, 617 (2004).
160. No empirical studies have validated PAS. See sources cited supra note 157.
161. Janet Johnston, in a study of high-conflict custody disputes, observed that preadolescent
children (roughly eight to twelve years old) align defensively with one parent in high-conflict divorces
and found many sources of hostility besides brainwashing. Janet Johnston, Parental Alignments and
Rejection: An Empirical Study of Alienation in Children of Divorce, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L.
158, 158 (2003).
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complex and involves qualitative assessments based on problematic predictions,
interpretations, and inferences. Currently, there is no legitimate basis for
evaluating the source of alienation in many cases, or of its impact on the child’s
welfare or importance relative to other custody factors. MHPs who offer
opinions on alienation in custody proceedings are acting beyond the limits of
scientific knowledge.
D. Bad Science and the Absence of Evidentiary Standards
The misuse of psychological science in custody proceedings is facilitated by
the absence of the evidentiary restrictions that apply to other legal proceedings.
The admissibility of scientific evidence is regulated in most state and federal
courts by the Daubert test, devised by the Supreme Court to exclude unreliable
testimony and assure that the expert’s input is relevant to the facts at issue in
162
the case. The mandate that scientific evidence be subject to a threshold
examination for validity and reliability is guided by the intuition that expert
witnesses rendering opinions can disproportionately influence fact finders
163
simply by virtue of their status as experts.
For the most part, testimony by MHPs in custody proceedings has not been
subject to this screening: Few jurisdictions require systematic scrutiny of the
164
scientific merits of these experts’ opinions. In part, courts may abstain from
screening because most experts in custody proceedings are neutral and court
appointed, and the judge’s appointment probably evidences her confidence in
165
the scientific merit of the expert’s opinion. Further, because judges, and not
juries, hear custody cases in most states, appellate courts might believe that
judges can sort good from bad science as they consider expert opinions.
But little evidence supports this assumption. Courts routinely consider
expert testimony on PAS, for example, despite the lack of any scientific

162. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (holding that evidence must
be grounded in reliable scientific methodology and reasoning and must be relevant to the facts of case).
Daubert replaced Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), for federal purposes, but the Frye
test is still applied in a few states. See CONLEY & MORIARTY, supra note 121, at 58–74. Daubert directs
judges deciding whether scientific evidence is admissible to evaluate whether the theoretical basis of
the opinion is testable, whether the technique or approach on which it is based has been subject to peer
review, and whether the technique or approach is generally accepted in the general scientific
community. 509 U.S. at 593.
163. See CONLEY & MORIARTY, supra note 121, at 40.
164. See White v. Kimrey, 847 So. 2d 157, 164–65 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (accepting PAS diagnosis and
giving father physical custody); Karen B. v. Clyde M., 574 N.Y.S.2d 267, 267 (Fam. Ct. 1991) (accepting
PAS diagnosis in concluding sexual abuse allegation is fabricated); Doerman v. Doerman, No. CA200103-071, 2002 WL 1358792, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 2002) (upholding decision to retain custody in
father due to mother’s severe PAS). In criminal proceedings, some courts have rejected PAS testimony.
See, e.g., People v. Loomis, 658 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788–89 (County Ct. 1997) (rejecting PAS testimony to
show child sexual abuse allegation was fabricated).
165. Thomas Reidy, Richard Silver & Alan Carlson, Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges,
23 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1989) (weighing court-appointed experts’ opinions more heavily than those of party
experts).
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foundation for this diagnosis. In general, scientific observers have concluded
that most psychological evidence currently admitted in these proceedings would
167
be excluded under Daubert, and should not carry weight in judges’ decisions.
As long as the best-interests standard persists as the custody decision rule,
judges are likely to urge mental-health experts to offer opinions on the ultimate
issue of custody unless they are legally restricted from doing so by the
evidentiary screen that applies to other legal proceedings. This collaboration
between judges and MHPs has contributed to the entrenchment of the bestinterests standard; the assumption that MHPs have the expertise to guide courts
in applying the standard obscures its intractable evidentiary challenges. The
problem is that psychological experts cannot perform this assignment without
exceeding the boundaries of their scientific expertise, and their participation in
custody proceedings does nothing to improve the accuracy of custody
determinations.
VI
REFORMING THE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARD
Our account of the state of modern custody law and practice is somewhat
gloomy: Current doctrine is even more problematic than Professor Mnookin
and other scholars have recognized, and it is reinforced by a powerful political
dynamic that impedes reform and also by misplaced confidence in the ability of
mental-health experts to guide courts in making custody determinations. Under
the conditions that we have described, what steps can be taken to improve
custody decisionmaking?
In this part, we explore reforms that potentially can reduce the error and
other costs of resolving custody disputes and that have some prospect of
adoption by lawmakers. Most ambitiously, we propose that the best-interests
standard be refined and narrowed through the adoption of the ALI
approximation standard, a sound and relatively verifiable proxy for best
168
interests for which accurate evidence can be obtained. Approximation
allocates custody on the basis of past caretaking in most cases, and thus largely
obviates the need for psychological testimony. It also represents a compromise
between the alternative rules favored by mothers and fathers, which both
interest groups might ultimately be persuaded to accept. Moreover, other
stakeholders who currently support the best-interests standard may favor this
alternative rule if they comprehend that MHPs lack the expertise to guide
judges in making custody decisions.
166. See sources cited supra note 164.
167. See Erickson et al., supra note 125; Shuman, supra note 118. Tippins and Wittman note that
“scholarly argument supporting the empirical foundations for . . . [custody] recommendations is scant to
nonexistent . . . .” Tippins & Wittman, supra note 16, at 211. In part VI, we argue that Daubert, 509 U.S.
579, should be applied to custody proceedings and that evidence on PAS should be excluded.
168. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (2002); Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, supra note
4.
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But even under the current legal standard, evidentiary and procedural
reforms can be implemented to improve custody decisionmaking. First, reforms
that promote accuracy in adjudication are desirable. Lawmakers should restrict
the role of psychological experts by applying to custody proceedings the
standards that govern the admissibility of scientific evidence in other legal
169
proceedings. Second, reforms that aim to avoid adjudication altogether, such
170
as collaborative divorce and mediation, have gained traction in many states as
lawmakers recognize that, in most cases, parents are in a better position than
171
judges to plan for their children’s future custody.
A. The Case for Approximation
The approximation standard allocates future custody proportionately
between the parents on the basis of the caretaking roles they had while the
172
family was intact. Unlike the primary-caretaker preference, approximation
does not frame the custody decision as a zero-sum game in which one parent
wins and the other loses. In most cases, the parents continue to share
decisionmaking authority and each parents’ allocation of physical custody is
determined on the basis of the family’s past practices. Current research
173
indicates that fathers perform about one-third of child care; thus, a typical
custody order would allocate time between the parents on this basis. If the
parents have shared caretaking responsibility equally before dissolution, their
custody arrangement will be much like joint physical custody.
Although no custody rule will provide the optimal outcome in every case,
approximation mirrors the underlying policy goals of custody law at least as
well as do any of the psychological and emotional factors that currently serve as
proxies for best interests. Basing custody on past parental care promotes
continuity and stability in the child’s environment and relationships, preserving
caretaking arrangements with which both the child and the parents are
174
familiar. Approximation is grounded not only in developmental knowledge
169. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
170. In collaborative divorce, both parties and their attorneys stipulate that, if the parties cannot
reach agreement, the attorneys will not represent them in adjudicating the dispute. See generally
Penelope Bryan, “Collaborative Divorce”: Meaningful Reform or Another Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 1001 (1999).
171. See Singer, supra note 19 (describing this trend). Some states mandate mediation for most
couples who petition for a hearing. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3170–3173 (West 2004) (directing
mediation in most cases upon petition for custody hearing).
172. See Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, supra note 4 (proposing
approximation standard). In 2000, the ALI adopted a custody standard based on approximation. See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002).
173. See Suzanne Bianchi, Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic Change or
Surprising Continuity?, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 401, 411 (2000) (reporting study with this finding). A division
of custodial time in which one parent gets 120 days or more of custodial time per year constitutes joint
custody for child-support purposes in many states. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (2009).
174. Many joint-custody families drift toward an arrangement in which the child lives
predominately with the mother. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 127, at 162–70. This might
suggest that parents (and children) are more comfortable with their predissolution roles than with the
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that confirms the importance of the bond between the child and the caretaking
175
parent, but also in recent research confirming the critical role of fathers as
secondary parents.
Moreover, approximation creates a proxy that is easier to verify than the
qualitative factors prominent under the best-interests standard and it functions
as a substitute for key factors that are otherwise nonverifiable. Under the
approximation standard, relevant evidence includes concrete behavior that
establishes the family’s caretaking practices and routines; thus, qualitative
evidence is inadmissible except in those cases where one parent is alleged to be
176
unfit to care for the child. To be sure, caretaking evidence might also depend
on private family information. But courts can more accurately evaluate
objective and quantitative evidence of caretaking than the qualitative factors
177
that dominate under current law. Furthermore, past caretaking itself provides
the best available indicator of hard-to-measure factors such as the parent–child
bond or parental competence.
The exclusion of qualitative behavioral evidence in all but extreme cases will
have salutary effects beyond promoting accuracy and reducing the verifiability
problems faced by courts today. First, restricting the range of evidence should
discourage litigation and simplify proceedings, thereby reducing adjudication
costs. It should also reduce the inclination of spouses to focus on each other’s
deficiencies—the dimension of custody adjudications that has the most costly
repercussions. Finally, in most cases, there should be little need for
psychologists in custody proceedings, and those who do participate will be more
motivated to offer observations within the scope of their expertise.
How will evidence of domestic violence and parental alienation be dealt
with under the approximation standard? Evidence of serious domestic violence
can fairly be treated as evidence that a parent is unfit for custody; it should
continue to operate as a trump in determining custody. We will suggest some
reforms that might assist courts in accurately evaluating domestic-violence
claims. Evidence of alienation, in contrast, should be excluded: We simply lack
adequate knowledge to evaluate alienation claims and to weigh the importance
of alienation in a framework that focuses on caretaking roles.

preferences they expressed at the time of divorce. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child
Custody, supra note 4, at 635.
175. Attachment theory emphasizes the bond between the child and the caretaking parent; it has
been invoked in support of the primary-caretaker preference. For the classic treatment, see generally
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973) (applying attachment theory in support of primary-caretaker preference).
176. Unfitness has always been a basis for excluding a parent from custody. Proof of serious
domestic violence constitutes unfitness under most states’ presumptions. See supra text accompanying
note 85.
177. Courts should be able to discern the approximate extent to which parents share caretaking
responsibilities. If one parent does not work outside the home, a presumption that she is a primary
caretaker is reasonable. If both parents work full-time, then teachers, physicians, coworkers, and
babysitters can corroborate or undermine the assumption that the parents have shared caretaking
responsibilities.
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Notwithstanding the merits of the approximation approach, the politicaleconomy deadlock described in part III might impede its implementation. But
since approximation does represent a compromise between the rules favored by
advocates for mothers and fathers, neither is likely to mobilize against this
reform with the intensity directed against gender-based reform proposals.
Moreover, if fathers continue to assume a more active role in child care, a norm
of equal sharing of custodial responsibility might emerge. Even today, typical
custody arrangements under an approximation standard would be closer to
178
shared custody than to the traditional custody and visitation. Approximation
is less vulnerable to allegations of unfairness by either mothers or fathers than
179
alternative rules, including the best-interests standard. Approximation offers
180
no windfall for a minimally involved parent, and it also does not relegate
either parent to second-class “visitor” status.
Mothers’ and fathers’ groups have dominated political-reform efforts
related to custody doctrine, but neither is likely to take the lead in promoting
the approximation standard. However, other stakeholders, including advocates
for children, family-law attorneys, and judges, can play this role. Attorneys’ and
judges’ groups have joined with mothers’ groups to defeat joint-custody
legislation, defending the discretionary best-interests standard. But these
groups and others who elevate the interests of children over those of either
mothers or fathers might well be enlisted in support of the approximation
standard if they come to appreciate the peculiar deficiencies of the bestinterests standard. Family-court judges care about making custody decisions
that promote children’s welfare, and currently they believe that they can apply
the best-interests standard with the assistance of MHPs. If judges understand
that their confidence in psychological expertise is misplaced, they may support
reform. Moreover, some evidence suggests that legislators would welcome an
environment in which custody-reform efforts were driven less by gender politics
181
than has been the case over the past generation. The ALI’s adoption of the
approximation standard gives the standard credibility as a custody rule that has
been studied and endorsed by a respected organization of attorneys, judges, and
182
academics. Approximation may appeal to a new coalition of advocates who

178. Recent studies indicate that fathers currently provide about one-third of childcare in married
families, so approximation would result in greater custodial sharing than traditional arrangements.
Bianchi, supra note 173; see generally Robert Emery, Rule or Rorschach? Approximating Children’s
Best Interests, 1 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 132, 132 (2007).
179. See sources cited supra note 71 (providing evidence that the best-interests standard tends to
favor mothers).
180. Some mothers’ advocates hold this view of joint custody. This response seems less likely if
parents shared caretaking responsibility equally when the family was intact. Scott, Pluralism, Parental
Preference and Child Custody, supra note 4, at 625.
181. Hearing on SB 243 and SB 244, supra note 74 (statement of Bill Howe, Chair, Oregon Task
Force on Family Law).
182. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002). The principles, including the approximation standard, were approved by
the Council of the American Law Institute and adopted by the ALI membership in 2000.
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have thus far played a subsidiary role and to legislators seeking to reduce the
emotional costs of resolving child-custody disputes.
B. Improving Accuracy in Custody Proceedings
Even if the best-interests standard remains the legal rule, there are several
procedural reforms that can improve the ability of courts to obtain accurate
information regarding family functioning. First, psychological experts whose
input is solicited in custody proceedings should be restricted to testimony based
on evidence that has a solid scientific basis. Second, enhanced standards of
proof can deter marginal domestic-violence claims and thereby increase the
likelihood that legitimate claims will be recognized.
In most legal proceedings, scientific evidence offered by experts is
183
admissible only after it is screened for reliability and relevance. As we have
discussed, no such restrictions limit the admissibility of psychological evidence
184
in custody proceedings. Opinions based on bad science can be excluded if
psychological testimony in custody proceedings is subject to the same screening
that aims to exclude deficient or irrelevant expert testimony in legal trials
185
generally.
The potential benefits of this reform apply most clearly to evidence offered
by neutral evaluators appointed by courts. When parties seek to introduce
psychological evidence, both opposing counsel and the court are typically
sensitive to deficiencies and biases in the expert’s opinion. But the expertise of
a court-appointed psychologist is often unquestioned and her opinion thus
carries authoritative weight. As we have shown, however, there is little support
for the assumption that an expert’s “neutrality” means that her opinion will be
unbiased and based on scientifically reliable methods and procedures. Without
a formal opportunity to challenge the court-appointed expert’s opinion before it
is offered in evidence, the party disfavored by the opinion is often seriously
disadvantaged. Applying the conventional scrutiny to this evidence can reduce
undue deference to the opinions of these experts.

183. See supra text accompanying note 162; see also CONLEY & MORIARTY, supra note 121, at 29–
74 (discussing admissiblility standards); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
LAW 30–43 (4th ed. 1998).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 157–160, 164 (noting PAS testimony is often admitted in
custody proceedings but rejected in criminal and tort proceedings). The response to “child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome” is similar. Courts typically exclude this evidence in criminal sexual-abuse
cases when it is introduced in support of the credibility of the claim. See State v. Moran 728 P.2d 248
(Ariz. 1988) (excluding evidence that child’s behavior is consistent with sexual abuse); Mindombe v.
United States, 795 A.2d 39 (D.C. 2002). Evidence of the syndrome (or that the child showed behaviors
consistent with sexual abuse) has been admitted in custody proceedings. See, e.g., In re Cheryl H., 200
Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct. App. 1984); Tracy V. v. Donald W., 632 N.Y.S.2d 697 (App. Div. 1995) (basing
custody decision on expert testimony that child’s behavior (including overeating) corroborated
allegation of sexual abuse); Matter of Le Favour v. Koch, 508 N.Y.S.2d 320 (App. Div. 1986) (admitting
expert testimony that child’s allegation was “worthy of belief” in custody proceeding).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 164–165.
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This reform would represent a substantial change in judicial practice,
severely limiting the role of MHPs in custody proceedings. Expert opinions
about the optimal custody arrangement would be excluded, along with
unscientific diagnoses such as PAS. Beyond this, MHPs would be discouraged
from offering pure credibility assessments, unsubstantiated predictions, or
qualitative assessments on the basis of unsupported inferences. Testimony
based on direct observations (and limited interpretation of this data) and
established diagnoses would be admissible, but courts would have to undertake
the demanding calculus required by the best-interests standard without the
assistance of psychological experts. This challenge may expose that the
predominant legal standard is unworkable.
How would this evidentiary reform affect the application of the domesticviolence presumption? Raising the standard applied to evidence supporting
claims of family violence will assist courts in separating legitimate allegations
from those that are marginal. This reform would retain the presumption
disfavoring for custody a parent who has engaged in domestic violence, but
would limit its application to cases in which a parent’s allegation is supported by
186
substantial corroborating evidence. This evidence could include medical or
police reports from recent or past incidents or the testimony of witnesses. But
courts would not permit clinical testimony that the claimant is credible. Neither
judges nor MHPs should be asked to choose between the competing accounts of
187
parents: They are simply not qualified to perform this task. The requirement
of corroborating evidence may exclude some legitimate claims of family
violence, but the permissive evidentiary standard that prevails under current
law encourages strategic behavior that ultimately may lead to judicial
188
skepticism about family-violence claims in general.
C. Avoiding Adjudication: Collaborative Divorce and Mediation
Even if the approximation standard and the proposed evidentiary reforms
are adopted, litigating custody will always be a costly undertaking. Outcomes
are subject to error, and adjudication is expensive and likely to generate
hostility between the parents, undermining their ability to cooperate in raising
their child. Thus, most families will benefit if parents avoid adjudication
altogether by making decisions about custody themselves. Two promising
approaches might assist parents in achieving this goal. Collaborative divorce

186. An alternative advocated by one thoughtful reader is to require an elevated burden of proof
(clear and convincing evidence), but not to absolutely exclude the claimant who lacks corroborating
evidence of abuse. This is a plausible alternative that might separate strategic from legitimate claims,
but we are somewhat reluctant to endorse it because it depends on a judicial credibility assessment.
187. Some state statutes require corroborating evidence. See ABA COMM. DOM. VIOLENCE, supra
note 60.
188. Johnston et al., supra note 88. A smaller percentage of child–sexual abuse claims are
substantiated. Id. at 287. Johnston, Lee, Olesen and Walters include “expert testimony” as a
corroborating factor. Id. at 287. On our view, this alone cannot count as corroboration; thus the rate of
corroboration is lower than they estimate.
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involves a precommitment compact by parties and their attorneys to negotiate a
settlement agreement. For parents who cannot resolve their disputes through
negotiation, mediation offers a process that facilitates agreement to the lasting
benefit of both parents and children.
Collaborative divorce strategies were devised to encourage parties to reach
agreement about custody and other divorce matters by increasing the cost of
189
adjudication ex ante. Parties and their attorneys execute a contract in which
attorneys agree that they will not represent their clients if negotiations fail and
the dispute moves to litigation. This commitment to negotiating with the goal of
reaching agreement is likely to reduce threats, bluffs, and other strategic
behavior that can cause negotiations to break down. Further, the anticipated
financial and psychological cost to the parties of finding new attorneys to
represent them in litigation should deter uncooperative behavior in
negotiations.
In custody mediation, parents make decisions about their child’s future
custody while the mediator controls the process, pressing the parents to
separate hostile feelings for each other from their mutual concern for their
190
child. Although this form of dispute resolution might not be appropriate in
some families, research studies indicate that resolving custody disputes through
mediation is generally associated with better postdivorce outcomes for parents
and children.
A major longitudinal study by Robert Emery and his colleagues supports
191
this conclusion. In both randomized trials as well as evaluations of large-scale
programs, mediation, as compared to attorney negotiations and formal
adjudication, was shown to (1) result in a larger percentage of cases settled out
192
of court, (2) substantially increase party satisfaction with the process of
189. Bryan, supra note 170. Many articles about collaborative divorce have appeared in bar
journals. See, e.g., Patricia Gearity, ADR and Collaborative Lawyering in Family Law, 35 MD. B.J. 2
(2002); Mary Gallagher, Collaborative Divorce, 164 N.J. L.J. 1 (2001); Shiela Gutterman, Collaborative
Family Law, 30 COLO. LAW. 57 (2001).
190. Mediators can challenge parties’ strategic behavior and encourage them to find areas of
overlapping interest that might suggest solutions to their dispute. See EMERY, RENEGOTIATING
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 29, at 147.
191. These researchers studied seventy-one mostly low-income families in which the parents had
failed to reach agreement about custody. The families were randomly assigned to mediation or
adversary-resolution groups and tracked periodically, including by way of a twelve-year follow-up.
Robert E. Emery & Melissa Wyer, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: An Experimental
Evaluation of the Experience of Parents, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 179 (1987); Robert
E. Emery, Sheila Matthews & Melissa Wyer, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Further Evidence
on the Differing Views of Mothers and Fathers, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 410 (1991)
[hereinafter Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation]; Robert E. Emery, Sheila Matthews
& Katherine Kitzmann, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Parents’ Satisfaction and Functioning a
Year After Settlement, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 124 (1994); Robert E. Emery, Lisa
Billings, Mary Waldron, David Sbarra & Peter Dillon, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation:
Custody, Contact, and Co-Parenting 12 Years After Initial Dispute Resolution, 69 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323 (2001) [hereinafter Emery et al., Mediation and Litigation 12 Years After].
192. See Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation, supra note 191, at 412 (showing that
eleven percent of the cases randomly assigned to mediation, compared to seventy-two percent of the
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dispute resolution, and, most importantly, (3) lead to improved relationships
between nonresidential parents and children, as well as between the separated
194
or divorced parents themselves. The researchers found that nonresidential
parents who mediated maintained closer contact with their children and saw
195
them more often than those who litigated. Interparental conflict was
196
significantly lower in the mediation group. Moreover, twelve years after
divorce, residential parents in the mediation group reported more cooperation,
197
communication, and involvement on the part of nonresidential parents. This
study supports the potential of mediation to bring about improved family
relationships even many years after separation and divorce.
To be sure, mediation is not a panacea. The quality of mediators varies and
some court-based mediation programs reportedly coerce parents to reach
agreement, which might disadvantage one party where there is a power
198
imbalance in the relationship. Moreover, more research is needed to support
the positive findings of studies by Emery and others. Nonetheless, existing
evidence strongly suggests that less adversarial approaches to dispute resolution
promote cooperation and involvement of both parents after divorce, factors
strongly correlated with child and family well-being.
Many observers have noted the irony that the best-interests standard seems
designed instead to undermine children’s welfare in the context of family
199
dissolution. Making progress toward a child-custody regime that promotes the

cases assigned to the adversary-resolution group, involved appearance in front of a judge).
193. Emery and his colleagues found that, on average, parents reported greater satisfaction with
mediation than adversary resolution on items assessing both the presumed strengths of mediation (for
example, “your feelings were understood”) and the presumed strengths of litigation (for example,
“your rights were protected”). Fathers reported more satisfaction with mediation, perhaps because
mothers usually won in court and therefore were generally quite satisfied with litigation. Id. at 415.
194. For a summary of the studies by Emery and his colleagues, sources cited supra note 191,
together with findings from other major research studies, see Robert E. Emery, David Sbarra & Tara
Grover, Divorce Mediation: Research and Reflections, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 22 (2005).
195. See Emery et al., Mediation and Litigation 12 Years After, supra note 191, at 330. Twelve years
after the initial dispute, 30% of nonresidential mediation-group parents saw their children once a week
or more, whereas only 9% of nonresidential adversary resolution–group parents did. Id. Likewise, 54%
of nonresidential meditation-group parents spoke to their children on the telephone once a week or
more, whereas only 13% of nonresidential adversary resolution–group parents did. Id.
196. Id. at 323.
197. Id. at 326 (comparing the reports of residential parents in both the mediation and adversaryresolution groups, nonresidential mediation-group parents (1) were significantly more likely to discuss
problems with their residential counterparts, (2) had a greater influence on childrearing decisions, and
(3) were more involved in the children’s discipline, grooming, moral training, errands, holidays,
significant events, school or church functions, recreational activities, and vacations).
198. Opponents have been critical of mandatory mediation generally and of any use of mediation in
custody disputes involving domestic violence; statutes authorize courts to exclude violence-involving
cases from mediation. See CAL. FAM. CODE §3170(b) (West 2004); see generally Tina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). In general, mandatory
mediation only requires attendance at one educational session, after which parties are free to pursue
other dispute resolution. Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The
Beginning of the End for Mandatory Mediation, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 372 (2009).
199. See Robert E. Emery & Melissa Wyer, Divorce Mediation, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 472 (1987).
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interests of children will not be easy, but the reforms outlined above will go
some distance toward reducing the costs of custody decisionmaking and
ultimately the costs of divorce itself. The approximation standard is based on a
relatively uncontroversial proxy for best interests and its adoption would reduce
error costs under the best-interests standard. Moreover, even if the current law
is retained, evidentiary reforms, particularly restriction of MHPs’ participation
in custody proceedings, may improve accuracy and clarify that experts cannot
resolve the indeterminacy of the best-interests standard. Finally, encouraging
parents to resolve custody disputes through cooperative negotiation and
mediation rather than litigation will result in better outcomes for most families.
VII
CONCLUSION
The entrenchment of the best-interests standard over the past forty years
can be understood as arising from two quite different but interrelated sources.
First, a political-economy deadlock resulting from a gender war between
advocates for fathers and mothers has deterred movement toward a more
determinate rule. Second, judges are relatively satisfied with the standard in
part because they can enlist mental-health experts, who are assumed to have the
expertise to guide custody decisionmaking. But we have demonstrated that
neither mental-health experts nor courts have the expertise to apply the bestinterests standard in many cases. Recognition of this incapacity may break the
political-economy deadlock and provide the necessary catalyst for needed
reforms.

